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CORNELL LAW REVIEW
[Legal scholarship has moved] toward substitution of the world of
concepts for the actual world in which the justice function must be
performed. Intellectual models are created and manipulated in ex-
quisite detail. Often, however, little interest is displayed in demon-
strating that the model assumed bears any relation to social and
political reality.'
INTRODUCTION
The principal functions of legal scholarship are to describe insti-
tutions, to explain their existence, and to recommend changes.2 The
first of these, sometimes referred to disparagingly as "mere" descrip-
tion, is in disrepute.3 As a consequence, the other two-the analytical
functions-tend to dominate.
The analytical functions usually involve the application of some
method to a substantive area of law or to a particular problem. Typi-
cally, the method limits the researcher's attention to a few aspects of
reality and requires the researcher to represent them abstractly. The
economist, for example, works in a world of organizations and ex-
changes. To the game theorist, the universe consists of players,
choices, and payoffs. The sociologist sees only social groups and the
norms they generate. To the linguist or discourse analyst, there are
only texts, meanings, and interpretations.
Restricting one's attention to particular aspects of reality reduces
complexity, making it possible to solve problems that otherwise would
boggle the mind. The disadvantage in restricting one's attention,
however, is that it often screens out important aspects and leads the
analyst to the wrong conclusion.
Seldom are legal scholars' abstractions sufficiently well defined
that they can be operationalized 4 and the assertions made about them
tested empirically. One must accept (or reject) on faith that people
are utility maximizers, that texts have meaning, or that people would
I Francis A. Allen, The Dolphin and the Peasant: Ill-Tempered, but Brief Comments on Legal
Scholarship, Nw. RPe., Spring 1990, at 8, 11.
2 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HAv. L. Rv. 1393, 1435 (1996) (noting that "[m] ost legal
scholarship consists of prescriptions or recommendations to public decisionmakers" and
arguing that "prescriptive discourse is what distinguishes legal scholarship and requires it
to deploy a methodology distinct from those of other disciplines").
3 But see Robert W. Gordon, Layers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground," 91 MIcH. L.
Ray. 2075, 2087 (1993) ("Sometimes I think I would happily trade a whole year's worth of
the doctrinal output turned out regularly by smart law review editors and law teachers for a
single solid piece describing how some court, agency, enforcement process, or legal trans-
action actually works.").
4 "Among social scientists, a concept is said to be operationalized when it is ex-
pressed in objectively verifiable terms." Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and




make particular choices behind a veil of ignorance. One effect of the
screening out of complexity is to protect the scholar from contradic-
tion by facts. Another is to render much of modem legal scholarship
highly stylized and largely divorced from reality.
"Systems analysis" is a methodology developed in the fields of en-
gineering, business information systems, and computer programming
specifically to manage complexity. Instead of screening complexity
out, the systems analyst attempts to accommodate as much complexity
as possible. A comprehensive description of the system's functioning
is a precondition to the analysis. Abstraction is employed sparingly,
and, in the kind of systems analysis that is advocated in this Article,
every concept is operationalized, so that every proposition can be
tested empirically.
Systems analysis proceeds by identifying systems, discovering their
goals or attributing goals to them, mapping their subsystems and the
functions each performs, determining their internal structures, de-
picting them with attention paid to efficiency of presentation, and
searching for internal inconsistencies. 5 These methods generate ana-
lytical power by increasing the number of goals, elements, and circum-
stances that the analyst can take into account simultaneously. These
methods also provide a language by which to express the kinds of rela-
tionships that are commonly encountered. 6
This Article describes the methods of systems analysis and how
they are being applied in the field of law.7 Part I describes these
5 SeeJOHN G. BURCH, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, DESIGN. AND IMPLEMENTATION 36-61 (1992)
(describing the process of creating systems models); MICHAEL L. GIBSON & CARY T.
HUGHES, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND DESIGN 1-9 (1994) (describing how to establish a framework
for systems analysis); ERvIN LASZLO, INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMS PHILOSOPHY 15-21 (1972)
(describing the methodological and conceptual foundations of systems philosophy); GER-
ALD M. WEINBERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL SYSTEMS THINKING 51-86 (1972) (describ-
ing systems theory).
6 See, e.g., LASZLO, supra note 5, at 10-11 (proposing "systems concepts" as a "general
metalanguage of scientific discourse" and giving examples of useful terms). Among the
terms in common use are "wholeness," "feedback," "steady and stationary states," and "en-
tropy," id. at 19, as well as "homeostasis" and "equifinality," id. at 11.
7 For examples of the self-conscious application of systems analysis in law, see LYNN
M. LoPucKi & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDrr: A SYSTEMS APPROACH (1995) (present-
ing a systems analysis of secured credit); Todd R. Benson, Taking Security in China: Ap-
proaching U.S. Practices? 21 YALEJ. INT'L L. 183 (1996) (describing the Chinese system for
secured lending and collecting); Gary L. Blasi, Litigation on Behalf of the Homeless: Systematic
Approaches, 31 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 137 (1987) (analyzing "the systems and institutions
that place people on the streets and keep them there"); Lynn M. LoPucki & George G.
Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing US. and Canadian Reorganization of Financially Dis-
tressed Companies, 35 HARv. INT'L L.J. 267 (1994) (comparing the U.S. and Canadian sys-
tems for bankruptcy reorganization); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.
1 (1996) (using a systems analysis to argue that the current liability system will fail); Lynn
M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State of Incorporation Should Be the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing.
A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REv. 577 (1995) [hereinafter LoPucki, Debtor's State] (analyz-
ing the system for filing and searching in the Uniform Commercial Code filing systems).
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methods as they are traditionally applied in computer programming,
business information systems, and a few related fields. Part I also dis-
tinguishes systems analysis from related methods. Part II describes the
shift in perspective from law as a conceptual system to law as an ele-
ment of concrete, empirically-verifiable "law-related" systems. Part III
provides a step-by-step account of how one identifies and then ana-
lyzes a law-related system. Part IV compares this new legal methodol-
ogy to the weaker version that judges and legal scholars have long
employed. Part V illustrates how legal scholars can apply systems anal-
ysis to law-related systems by describing four systems projects, three
completed and one proposed. This Article concludes that systems
analysis has the potential to put legal scholarship in touch with reality.
I
WHAT Is SYSTEMS ANA.Ysis?
A "system" is "a regularly interacting or interdependent group of
items forming a unified whole."8 The "items" might be the atoms that
interact to form a molecule; the bones, organs, and tissues that consti-
tute the human body; the sun and planets that together form the solar
system; or the police, lawyers, judges, courts, prisons, and computer
programs that together make up the "criminal justice system." 9 To
"analyze" a system is to break it down into its constituent parts, to de-
Without using the term "systems analysis" to describe them, other writers have em-
ployed methods that would qualify as systems analysis as the term is used in this Article. See
LYNN M. LoPucKi mr AL., COMMERCIAL LAw: A SYSTEMS APPROACH (forthcoming 1998);
James A. Henderson,Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1982) [herein-
after Henderson, Process Constraints] (explaining that process restraints rather than sub-
stantive objectives account for substantive tort doctrine); Lynn M. LoPucki, A General
Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 311 [hereinaf-
ter LoPucki, State Remedies/Bankruptcy System] (describing the functions state bankruptcy
systems serve); WilliamJ. Stuntz, Defendant's Rights and the State's System (1996) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author) (describing dynamics of the system for criminal
prosecution and the recognition of defendants' rights). See alsoJames A. Henderson, Jr.,
The Efficacy of Organic Tort Reform, 77 CORNmL L. REv. 596, 608-11 (1992) (book review)
[hereinafter Henderson, Organic Tort Reform] (describing "an integrated, internally consis-
tent package of reforms, each part of which is both justified by reference to an underlying
norm ... and interrelated with the other parts" as "organic"); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy
Policymaking in an Imperfect Worl4 92 MICH. L. REv. 336, 350-52 (1993) (describing the func-
tion of a bankruptcy system as preserving the value of failing enterprises); William C. Whit-
ford, A Critique of the Consumer Credit Collection System, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 1047, 1096-1109
(describing the inefficiencies of execution in consumer cases).
8 WEBsT=R's NNTH NEW COLLEGIATE DIcaIONARY 1199 (1991) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S
NINTH]. A text on systems analysis and design defines a system as "a set of interrelated and
interactive elements that work together to accomplish specific purposes." GIBSON &
HUGHES, supra note 5, at 5. Notice that Gibson and Hughes have added the element of
"purpose" to the dictionary definition.
9 See LASZLO, supra note 5, at 25-30 (linking physical, chemical, biological, ecological,
sociological and political systems in a single "hierarchy" of systems composed of
subsystems).
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termine the nature and identity of its subsystems, and to explain the
relationships among them.
The idea that a molecule and a judicial system have enough in
common to make it profitable to study both using the same basic
methodology may at first seem odd.'0 In fact, the theory that links
them-called "general systems theory"-is less than three decades
old." "General systems theory" postulates that "systemness" is a char-
acteristic of the organization of the universe; for reasons not yet unex-
plained, phenomena order themselves largely as discrete systems. 12
Readers should distinguish the systems analysis advocated here
from systems theory, Parsonian functionalism, and related methods of
policy analysis. Although currently out of vogue,' 3 systems theory has
had, and continues to have, considerable success as a discipline. Sys-
tems theory is a set of principles14 arguably applicable to various kinds
of systems, including physical, biological, and social systems.' 5 Sys-
tems theory provides the theoretical basis for "systems analysis" as an
applied discipline and supplies many of the tools used in it. Systems
theories are seldom, however, directly useful in analyzing particular
law-related systems, so the discipline has limited applicability to law
reform. 6 At levels of broad generality, law-related systems probably
10 But see Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, Foreword to LASZLO, supra note 5, at xvii-xviii
(describing general systems theory as "models and principles of an interdisciplinary na-
ture, applying to generalized 'systems' or classes of systems independently of their realiza-
tion as mechanical, electrical, biological, social (etc.) systems").
11 Ludwig von Bertalanffy is generally credited as the originator of general systems
theory. LUDWIG VON BERTALANnFy, GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY (1968).
12 Laszlo refers to this concept as that of a "natural system," LAsZLO, supra note 5, at
30-32, and states that "much of the universe available to our scrutiny can be conceptually
'mapped' as hierarchies, i.e., as a realm of systems-in-environments, constituting higher
order systems which, within their particular environments, constitute systems of still more
inclusive order," id. at 19.
13 Kenneth Bailey suggests that the disrepute of systems theory in some quarters re-
sulted at least in part from its association with functionalism. KENNErH D. BAILEY, SocIoL-
oY AND THE NEv SYS-rEMs THEORY at xiii (1994) ("Social systems theory is alive and well
.... However, this contemporary variety is not characterized by the functionalism of the
1960s."). Probably its disrepute also results from so much of the work being carried on at a
level of abstraction that renders it largely unintelligible. This is particularly true of conti-
nental systems theory. See, e.g., Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 83 Nw. U. L. Rrv.
136 (1988).
14 Among the general system characteristics discovered are (1) autopoesis, the self-
generating, self-regulating, and self-reproducing nature of systems; (2) the tendency for
systems to become more structured, more capable and more vulnerable with age; (3) the
tendency for systems to accumulate information over time; and (4) entropy, the tendency
for systems to dissipate.
15 See LAsZLO, supra note 5, at 55-117; VON BERTALANFFY, supra note 11, at xviii. The
objective of systems theory is to discover principles applicable to all or many kinds of sys-
tems. See WEINBERG, supra note 5, at 35-38.
16 But see J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society
System: A Wake-Up CalforLegal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DuKE LJ.
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do respond to general system principles,1 7 but at the level of specific-
ity required for most legal reform, systems theory has little to offer.
"Policy analysis" is a method derived from systems analysis, which
was used in the 1960s to analyze government programs.' 8 It is, how-
ever, a method for making policy-that is, selecting goals-rather
than a method for analyzing systems. 19 It seems to have failed as a
method of policymaking because of the complexity involved in at-
tempting to link an agency's budget expenditures to the agency's
goals.20
"Parsonian functionalism," in a broad sense, is the attempt to "ex-
plain[ ] ... legal forms or practices by reference to social 'purposes'
or 'interests.'' Although the same is true of systems analysis, Par-
sonian functionalism differs in at least two respects that explain its
current disrepute. 22 First, the purposes or interests examined using
Parsonian functionalism are often highly abstract, ill-defined, "social
forces" that are incapable of being operationalized 23 and therefore
849 (1996) (applying "dynamical systems theory" to law by loose analogy to purportedly
find implications for legal structuring).
17 Systems theory has only rarely been applied to law. For examples of attempts to
make these kinds of broad applications, see Luhmann, supra note 13, and RuhI, supra note
16.
18 See, e.g., Aaron Wildavsky, Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS, 29 PUB. ADMIN. REv.
189, 190 (1969) [hereinafter Wildavsky, Rescuing Policy] (describing policy analysis as
"equivalent to.. . 'deciding on objectives of the organization, on changes in these objec-
tives, on the resources used to attain these objectives'" and as "similar to a broadly con-
ceived version of systems analysis"). See generally AARON WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO
POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF PoLIcy ANALYsis (1979) (discussing and employing policy
analysis).
19 See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARv. L.
REv. 393 (1981) (describing "comprehensive rationality" and "incrementalism" as the two
principal models of policy making by administrative agencies); Aaron Wildavsky, The Polit-
ical Economy of Efficiency, 1967 PUB. INTEREST 30, 34 (describing systems analysis as "con-
cerned with the building of models that abstract from reality but represent the crucial
relationships one is interested in studying"); id. at 31-33 (distinguishing systems analysis
from "cost benefit analysis"); id. at 38-41 (distinguishing systems analysis from "program
budgeting").
20 See generally Wildavsky, Rescuing Policy, supra note 18 (explaining policy analysis).
21 Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 61 n.11 (1984).
22 See id. at 68 ("Social scientists who have heard previous versions of this piece won-
der why I worry so much about evolutionism.., and functionalism...; these views have
been so thoroughly discredited in modern social theory, they argue, as to be left almost
without serious defenders."); see alsoJoan c. Williams, Culture and Certainty: Legal History
and the Reconstructive Project, 76 VA. L. REv. 713, 716 (1990) (agreeing with Gordon that
"functionalism... [has] long since lost respectability in the social sciences"). But see John
Stick, Charting the Development of Critical Legal Studies, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 407, 424 (1988)
(book review) (stating that "[Gordon's argument] only cuts against shallow forms of func-
tionalism which seek general historical laws and not particular explanations").
23 See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Con-
ceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. Rs~v. 73, 146-47 (1988) (noting the impossi-




are not empirically verifiable.24 Second, rightly or wrongly, Parsonian
functionalism has been tagged with the Panglossian notion that the
law always finds its way to the correct result.2 5 Systems analysis incor-
porates no such assertion.
Systems analysis regards systems as goal-seeking.2 6 That is, sys-
tems analysis regards each system as having one or more purposes or
functions. With biological systems, the idea seems intuitive. A rabbit,
for example, is a system. Most observers would not be troubled by the
notion of attributing to the rabbit the goals of finding food, surviving,
and reproducing. But with physical systems-an atom, for example-
the approach is counter-intuitive. An atom does not seem to have a
goal, and its "function" seems to be attributed to it by people who
themselves have goals. Nevertheless, many of the best metaphors for
explaining scientific phenomena depend on anthropomorphism.
Computers "search" for the right data, positive and negative electrical
charges "attract" one another, and a mixture of chemicals "seeks"
equilibrium.
Most legal scholars, judges, and legislators regard law-related sys-
tems as purposeful, and they do not hesitate to attribute to laws goals
or purposes, even ones distinct from the goals that the legislators who
enact them may have had in mind.2 7 For example, functionalism-
24 Gordon gives as a "comically vulgar" example, that "'the evolution of the right of
privacy was a response to the increasing complexity and interdependence of modem soci-
ety.'" Gordon, supra note 21, at 64. The example appears to be an apocryphal, but never-
theless a fair characterization of the manner in which the method was applied. See also id.
at 64-65 (presenting a list of additional examples).
25 See id. at 64.
26 See, e.g., C. WEST CHURCHMAN, THE SYSTEMS APPROACH 11 (2d ed. 1979) ("Systems
are made up of sets of components that work together for the overall objective of the
whole. The systems approach is simply a way of thinking about these total systems and
their components."); GmSON & HUGHES, supra note 5, at 5 ("[A] system is a set of interre-
lated and interactive elements that work together to accomplish specific purposes."); PAUL
S. LICKER, FUNDAMENTALS OF SySms ANALysis 5 (1987) ("A system is defined as a set of
elements that are related and that, through this set of relationships, aim to accomplish
goals.") (emphasis omitted).
27 See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 146-51 (rev. ed. 1969) (arguing that
it is meaningful to assign purposes to institutions, even though they do not have the capac-
ity to form mental states).
Guido Calabresi agrees:
Law is a human construct designed to accomplish certain goals. Often-
perhaps most of the time-the goals are terribly complex and hard to ana-
lyze clearly, and one is properly suspicious of analysis and prescription that
would discard time-honored legal terms because one cannot find immedi-
ate, clear policy justifications for them. Still, the object of law is to serve
human needs, and thus legal terms... must sooner or later be linked to the
service of human needs.
Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U.
CHI. L. REv. 69, 105 (1975); see also V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: Wat Purpose
Does It Serve? 109 HARv. L. REv. 1477 (1996) (criticizing corporate criminal liability as serv-
ing no discemable purpose). But see ERNESTJ. WEINRIB, THE IDEA Or PRIVATE LAW (1995)
1997]
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essentially the ascription of purposes to a legal system-continues to
dominate modem tort scholarship.28
The attribution of goals to systems is merely shorthand for one of
two propositions. The first, employed in positive analyses, is defini-
tional, holding that the goals of a system are the results that the system
in fact produces. The second, employed in normative analyses,
equates the goals with the results that the researcher believes desira-
ble. One who wishes to do so can conduct systems analyses by specify-
ing one of these propositions as a substitute for attributing goals to
systems. 2
9
When regarding a social system as goal-seeking, it is important to
distinguish the goals of the system from the goals of participants in
the system. The participants may have a variety of conflicting goals.
The prosecutor may seek to lock up as many people as possible for as
long as possible. The crusading public defender may seek only to
frustrate the prosecutor, or may even seek to "bring down the system."
The parole officer may want nothing more from the system than to
hang onto herjob and minimize the number of hours she must work.
The purpose of the system-to protect society and its members from
criminal activity-may enter none of their minds.
Nor is the existence of a system designer, who had goals for the
system in mind a prerequisite for the existence of a system. Systems
theory holds that systems are "autopoietic"-self creating. Systems
"shake into place" as their components and environment interact.
Numerous changes-some intended and some not-contribute to the
whole. Changes that are successful from the standpoint of the system
(arguing against theutilitarian view of private law); Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller's Theory of
Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litiga-
tion, 75 B.U. L. REv. 1273, 1285 (1995) (arguing that Fuller's concept of institutional pur-
pose "was not the same thing as a specific goal or clearly defined end-state").
Cost benefit analysis is probably the most prominent of the methods of legal analysis
that work by attributing goals and purposes to inanimate systems. One cannot conduct a
cost benefit analysis without first specifying what is a "benefit"-that is, specifying what
results the system regards as desirable and therefore seeks to achieve.
28 For example, Calabresi sees law as "a human construct designed to accomplish cer-
tain goals" and in 1975 stated that "It]his functional approach [had) come to dominate
American tort scholarship." Calabresi, supra note 27, at 105. Scholars have continued to
debate whether the purposes of the tort system are to deter, compensate, spread losses, or
some combination of these, in the process attributing purposes to the law-related system.
See Henderson, Process Constraints, supra note 7, at 901 ("Fierce debates have raged in re-
cent years over the objectives reflected in the tort-law system."); Robert L. Rabin, Law for
Law's Sake, 105 YALE L.J. 2261, 2262 (1996) (book review) (describing the prevailing view as
being that "tort law is only legitimate if it serves some useful purpose, and whether it meets
this test depends on its satisfaction of independent societal goals").
29 One might specify, for example, that x is the outcome produced by a system and
then go on to identify the subsystems that contribute to x. Alternatively, one might assert
that a particular combination of subsystems would be capable of producing outcome y,
which the analyst favors.
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survive; unsuccessful ones are overwritten.30 The system evolves to-
ward a state in which no one who has the power to impose changes on
the system would choose to do so. 3 1 Presumably, the system will then
serve its constituency reasonably well.
Systems are composed of subsystems. Subsystems are themselves
systems, which in turn have their own subsystems.3 2 For example, a
house typically includes at least the following subsystems: foundation,
structure (walls), roof, electrical system, plumbing system, and heating
and air conditioning system. The concrete foundation is itself a sys-
tem, one of the components of which is concrete. The crystalline
structure of concrete has as a subsystem, the molecules of its compo-
nents. Those molecules have atoms as their subsystems.
To analyze a system is to break it down into its component parts,
and to examine how those parts relate to one another and contribute
to the functioning of the whole. The emphasis in systems analysis is
on relationships rather than on the component parts themselves.
When analyzing social systems, analysts often seek to improve the
system's functioning. When they do, consistency and efficiency in
achieving the system's goals are the criteria for quality. The analyst
wants the system to work, or to work better.33 That is, however, not
always the case. Social groups often choose to employ systems that
contain inconsistencies or that work inefficiently. This may be true,
for example, of the law-related system for coercive collection of debts.
The legal remedies for creditors suing to collect under state law are
notoriously inefficient.3 4 Some scholars refuse to work on improving
30 The manner of change described here is exemplified in the common law method
of case adjudication and even more accurately in the "incrementalist" paradigm of admin-
istrative lawmaking. See Diver, supra note 19, at 399-400 (stating that under the incre-
mentalist model "policymaking becomes a series of small adjustments" and that
"incrementalism is decentralized" so that "[p]olicy is made by many actors at many levels of
government and indeed in the society at large").
31 This is not to say that the system ever reaches an equilibrium. The environment in
which law-related systems function is constantly in flux, continuously altering the optimal
system configuration.
32 See, e.g., BAiLY, supra note 13, at 189 (reprinting an illustration showing the hierar-
chical relationship with cells as constituents of organs, organs as constituent of organisms,
organisms as constituents of groups, groups as constituents of organizations, organizations
as constituents of communities, communities as constituents of societies, and societies as
constituents of supranational systems); LAszLo, supra note 5, at 19 (noting that "much of
the universe available to our scrutiny can be conceptually 'mapped' as hierarchies, i.e., as a
realm of systems-in-environments, constituting higher order systems which, within their
particular environments, constitute systems of still more inclusive order").
33 The concept of law as a component of law-related systems that can be created,
improved and redirected is arguably in conflict with the concept of natural law. Natural
law posits the moral superiority of particular outcomes; systems theory posits that the
moral superiority of an outcome may be relative to what else is occurring in the system at
the same time.
34 See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Critiquing the Foreclosure Process: An Economic Approach
Based on the Paradigmatic Norms of Bankruptcy, 79 VA. L. REv. 959, 959 (1993) ("In the vast
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them, however, because improvements would benefit the creditor
class.3 5
In any event, using a systems approach to determine and docu-
ment how systems work does not commit the researcher to their im-
provement. The "systems approach" is a method for understanding
systems. An analyst can seek to understand a system for the purpose
of rendering it inefficient, disrupting its functioning, or destroying it.
II
LAW-RELATED SYSTEMS
The potential for systems analysis to contribute to legal scholar-
ship is greatest with respect to concrete, law-related systems. A con-
crete system is one that exists in "physical space-time" and is
composed of real people and/or other physical objects. 36 The court
system, composed of courthouses, records, judges, clerks, lawyers, bai-
liffs, law books, and the like is an example of a concrete system. By
contrast, a conceptual system is a system whose basic units are words
or symbols. 37 The common law, conceived of as a set of integrated
concepts, is an example of a conceptual system. Some systems theo-
rists also distinguish a third type of system, an "abstracted" system, by
which they mean a model of a concrete system in which only the most
important variables are represented.38 Many of the models generated
in legal scholarship are abstracted systems.
That a system is "law-related" signifies only that formal law, that is,
state-made law, plays a role in it. Examples of law-related systems in-
clude the criminal justice system, the bankruptcy system, the tort sys-
tem, the banking system, and the system of private property. Each of
majority of cases, the sale price realized at... a foreclosure sale will be so inadequate that
not only will the mortgagor lose her home but she will also lose any equity she owns in the
property."); LoPucki, State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, supra note 7, at 316-21 (arguing that
the state remedies are highly inefficient in transferring value from debtor to creditor and
operate primarily in terrorem); Whitford, supra note 7, at 1126 ("Coercive execution is effec-
tive as leverage because of the harm visited on the debtor, largely due to secondary costs,
and because one execution always impliedly threatens another.").
35 But see Whitford, supra note 7, at 1127 ("My own intuition favors minimization of
the secondary costs [of execution], in large part because of my distaste for gaining settle-
ment leverage by threatening harm to another.").
36 See BAILEY, supra note 13, at 47. Concrete systems are sometimes referred to as
"real," "acting," or "physical" systems. Law professors with whom I have discussed systems
analysis are often troubled by the concept of a "physical" system. Systems analysts are com-
fortable with the term as a means of distinguishing the reality of a system from their model
of it. See, e.g., GIBSON & HUGHES, supra note 5, at 15 (making the distinction between a
"physical firm" and a "conceptual firm").
37 See BAILEY, supra note 13, at 47 (describing a typology of systems). Conceptual sys-
tems are sometimes referred to as "pattern" systems. See id.
38 See, e.g., id. at 55-57. "The abstracted system is a variable system-the units are
variables and the relationships are relationships among variables." Id. at 56 (emphasis
omitted).
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these systems is "law-related" in that state-made law "governs," and the
courts play some role in the operation of the system. Each is, how-
ever, only law-related, not legal, because the goals of the system are not
goals primarily associated with law, and important elements of the sys-
tem are not legal in nature.
Formal, state-made law is principally a means for governments to
control the behavior of individuals and groups.5 9 In most instances,
behavior can be controlled by other means. The most effective and
efficient means for controlling behavior usually is a physical means.40
If the government wishes to slow traffic, it can do so by installing
speed bumps. Alternatively, it can bank the highway so that speeders
tumble off on the curves. If the government wishes to protect private
property, it can build fences to prevent physical access, or it can de-
ploy police to physically restrain trespassers. If the theft of social se-
curity checks is a problem, the government can make direct deposits.
Because legal scholars are not used to thinking of physical constraints
on behavior as substitutes for the law, they go largely unnoticed.
The conduct of individuals is also often constrained by the "au-
tonomous law"41 that spontaneously arises in social groups42 and the
individuals' desires for continuing good relations with others. To il-
lustrate, even if there were no laws, no court system, and no physical
impediment to theft or the nonpayment of debts, most people might
still find it in their self-interest not to steal and to pay their debts.43
Formal law is not what structures society. Law is marginal.44
39 Some scholars define "law" more broadly to include "autonomous law," the means
by which groups maintain social control over their members. See Walter Otto Weyrauch &
Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the "Gypsies," 103 YALE LJ. 323
(1993). By whatever name known, autonomous law sometimes has the capacity to displace
or override formal law. See id. at 382-85. But see W. Michael Reisman, Autonomy, Interd pen-
dene, and Responsibility, 103YALE LJ. 401, 411 (1993) (arguing that "we need to know more
about the relationship between autonomous law and the law of the state before we can say
if and when one trumps the other"). Reisman's argument is undercut, however, by his
failure to dispute any of Weyrauch and Bell's examples.
40 Scholars have noted from time to time the possibility of substituting physical sys-
tems for law. See, e.g., Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modem
American Tort Theory, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 69 (1980) (commenting that "the most promising
way to reduce car accidents is by investing in the physical substructures of traffic").
41 See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 39, at 333-34. The concept is similar to that of
"social norms" in the literature of sociology.
42 See, e.g.,John Umbeck, A Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush, 20J.L.
& ECON. 421 (1977) (describing spontaneous ordering of claims by miners).
43 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WrrHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991) (using game theory to explain the development of informal institutions and norms
among cattle owners).
44 See HAROLD C. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CoNTRAcT 65 (1961) ("When
we are able to consider the matter without bias, we recognize that most of us are affected in
our actions only to a very limited degree by law."); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Rela-
tions in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963) (discussing the marginal
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Each of these three means of controlling behavior-the physical,
autonomous law, and governmental law-operates, to some degree,
by creating patterns of incentives and disincentives. One can speed
over speed bumps, but it is physically uncomfortable and may damage
one's automobile. Violate the autonomous law of the social group
and one may become the object of suspicion. The result may be the
loss of a business deal or worse. Violate government-made law and the
result may be arrest, prosecution, and incarceration. The patterns of
incentives and disincentives created by efforts to control behavior are
often complex. The persons whom the system seeks to control may
respond in correspondingly complex ways. I refer to these responses
as "legal strategy."45 The role of legal strategy in the analysis of law-
related systems is discussed below in Part III.E.
Law is a relatively expensive and, for the government, a relatively
dangerous way of controlling behavior. The resolution of even the
simplest conflict in court is likely to cost thousands of dollars, and the
resolution of a complex conflict is likely to cost millions. Even when
the system is willing to incur the expense, the promulgation and en-
forcement of law might not work. The system must adjudicate viola-
tions and stand ready to enforce its adjudications through the use of
violence. To the lawbreaker, the threat of legal sanctions is usually
highly abstract, problematic, and temporally distant. The process of
adjudication and enforcement may cause confrontations, exacerbate
conflicts, or ultimately lead to a rebellion against the government.
Where the physical control of behavior is technologically possi-
ble, it is usually cheaper, safer, and more effective than control
through law. Only where physical systems are impractical and autono-
mous law is inconsistent with the government's wishes, does it become
cost-effective for the government to control behavior through law.
For a law-related system, the law is a means of last resort. One conse-
quence is that law ends up being somewhat of a patchwork. Where
technology provides the means for controlling particular behavior,
effect of court enforced norms and legal sanctions in the governance of contractual
relations).
45 Legal strategy has gained increasing recognition in recent years. See, e.g., DOUGLASS
C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 4-5 (1990):
Conceptually, what must be clearly differentiated are the rules from the
players. The purpose of the rules is to define the way the game is played.
But the objective of the team within that set of rules is to win the game -
by a combination of skills, strategy, and coordination; by fair means and
sometimes by foul means. Modeling the strategies and the skills of the
team as it develops is a separate process from modeling the creation, evolu-
tion, and consequences of the rules.
See also LoPucki, supra note 4, at 1522-28, 1533-41, 1545-49; MarkJ. Roe, Corporate Strategic
Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L Ray. 1 (1986) (describing strategies); Weyrauch & Bell, supra
note 39, at 382-85 (presenting a theory of the role of legal strategy in accommodating
autonomously generated informal law to the system of state-made law).
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law is rarely used. The same is true in areas where social norms pro-
vide adequate control. Law's domain is only what is left over.46
For a concrete system to consist of nothing but law is virtually
impossible. To control behavior, the system must have at least some
physical components. Law is best thought of as an element of law-
related systems and a technique by which governments can intervene
in those systems.47
Not every system that controls human behavior will be law-re-
lated. Some systems are entirely physical, or depend only on volun-
tary cooperation. Although such a system might perform the same
function as a law-related system or even substitute for a law-related
system, such a system is outside the definition of a law-related system
for the simple reason that it does not involve any formal law.
Confining the study of law to concrete systems has at least three
advantages. First, the system can be operationalized and studied em-
pirically, giving the study objectivity.48 Second, partial criteria exist
for the normative evaluation of any proposed system reform: once the
reform is implemented, will the system be more or less able to achieve
its purposes? Third, the imperative that the system function, though
not always honored in fact, is honored sufficiently that one can often
infer the nature of parts of the system one cannot directly investigate.
This third advantage requires some elaboration. A law-related
system must operate within limits of physical reality which are impossi-
ble to ignore.49 For example, when debt is trading in an active market
for a given price, the court's declaration that it is worth more probably
will not increase its price. A cow that eats will gain weight regardless
46 Civil law probably makes a greater effort to be comprehensive. Yet, one can easily
imagine subjects that have never become the subject of a law for the simple reason that the
behavior that the law would control is already blocked by other means.
47 See ANN SEIDMAN & ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, STATE AND LAW IN THE DEVELOPMENT PRO-
CESS: PROBLEM-SOLVING AND INSTrITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE THIRD WORLD 75-84 (1994) (ad-
vocating a "problem-solving approach" for state intervention that relies heavily on
empirical research); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Richard N. Pearson, Implementing Federal
Environmental Policies: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429 (1978)
(describing the difficulty of controlling behavior through "aspirational commands" from
legislatures or courts); Robert B. Seidman, Justifying Legislation: A Pragmatic, Institutionalist
Approach to the Memorandum of Law, Legislative Theory, and Practical Reason, 29 Hav. J. ON
LEGIs. 1 (1992) (presenting a step-by-step empirical method for legislative intervention in
law-related systems).
48 Valuable insight may sometimes come from the study of matters that cannot be
operationalized and investigated empirically. But that insight is for the most part limited
to the person who has it. Unless a matter can be operationalized, neither science nor any
other rational means of resolving differences about it can be brought to bear.
49 See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 27, at 150 ("Coordination among the elements of a
legal system is not something that can simply be imposed; it must be achieved. Fortu-
nately, a proper sense of role, reinforced by a modicum of intelligence, will usually suffice
to cure any defaults of the formal system.").
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of what the court says about the process of consumption. 50 Courts can
lie about the effects of their actions, but the lies bring a law-related
system no closer to achieving its measurable goals.
Three examples of "system imperatives"-requirements that must
be met for the system to achieve its goals-may help to illustrate.
First, the bankruptcy reorganization of a financially distressed busi-
ness is a process accomplished through the drafting and adoption of a
written plan. To draft and adopt such a plan necessarily takes time. If
creditors are permitted to take coercive collection action during the
reorganization, the "facts" of the reorganization case will change in
unpredictable ways, making the process unworkable. Thus, Professor
George Triantis and I conclude that any system of bankruptcy reor-
ganization that relies on a written plan must include a stay of coercive
collection activity or some functional equivalent. 51
The second and third examples of system imperatives are both
examples of specific instances in which system imperatives overrode
clear legal doctrine to the contrary. The second involves the system
for titling, registering, and granting security interests in motor vehi-
cles. Generally, a security interest in a motor vehicle is effective
against a purchaser only if it is recorded on the vehicle's certificate of
title. Knowing this, prospective purchasers check the certificate on
file with the state government before purchasing. When a vehicle is
moved from one state to another, the system calls for a surrender of
the old certificate and the issuance of a new certificate by the destina-
tion state. The security interest can be preserved, because the destina-
tion state demands surrender of the old certificate and transfers
notations of security interests to the new certificate before destroying
the old one.
In stating the legal rule governing this process, the drafters of the
Uniform Commercial Code specified that liens noted only on the old
certificate would expire four months after the issuance of a "registra-
tion," rather than a "certificate of title" by the new state. Viewing the
law merely as a set of concepts, the reference to the registration was
not wrong; the statement making reference to the registration was not
verbally inconsistent with anything else in the Code. Viewing law as an
50 In dazzling displays of "junk science," courts have held that when cattle consumed
feed that was a secured creditor's collateral, the feed did not become part of the mass of
the cattle because "[o]nce eaten the feed not only loses its identity, but in essence it ceases
to exist and thus does not become part of the mass in the sense that the code uses the
phrase." First Nat'l Bank v. Bostron, 564 P.2d 964, 966 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); accord Farm-
ers Coop. Elevator Co. v. Union State Bank, 409 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1987). By the words "in
the sense that the code [sic] uses the phrase ['become[s] part of the mass']," the courts
signal that their holdings are limited to the world of legal concepts.
51 See LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 7, at 274-77 (outlining the functional imperatives
of a system of bankruptcy reorganization that relies on certain basic assumptions).
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element of a law-related system, however, reference to the registration
was wrong. If a debtor could register the debtor's vehicle without sur-
rendering the certificate of title and obtaining a new one,52 four
months after such a registration the creditor's security interest in the
vehicle would expire. Merely by registering the automobile in an-
other state and waiting four months, any debtor could strip the credi-
tor's lien from it. The creditor would not even know that this had
happened.
Not only was the reference to the registration wrong, it also was
unambiguous. Each state issued both a registration and a certificate
of title for each vehicle. The courts were forced to choose between
the clear and unambiguous command of the law and the imperative
that the system function. After struggling with the issue for some
time, the courts finally construed the reference to "registration" to be
a reference to the issuance of a certificate of title.5 3 The system im-
perative-only the issuance of a new certificate should start the four
month period running because only the issuance of a new certificate
would result in the preservation of the lien-overrode the clear word-
ing of the statute.54
A second example of a system imperative overriding the unam-
biguous command of the formal law is the continued functioning of
the United States Bankruptcy Courts from 1982 to 1984, after the de-
cision of the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co.55 In Marathon Pipe Line, the Court determined
that the grant of jurisdiction to the Bankruptcy Courts by Congress
was unconstitutional, because it put Article III power in the hands of
bankruptcy judges who did not have lifetime tenure 56 The Court de-
cided Marathon Pipe Line on June 28, 1982. The opinion stayed the
Court's judgment until October 4, 1982 to "afford Congress an oppor-
tunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid
means of adjudication, without impairing the interim administration
52 To explain the error, White and Summers offer a "vicious rumor" (which they attri-
bute to Homer Kripke, one of the drafters of Article 9) that the drafters were unaware of
this fact. "[T]he drafters[,] being mostly from the east coast, and knowledgeable only
about subways, airplanes, and limousines, did not realize that one could register an auto-
mobile without getting a certificate of title." 2 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERTS S. SUMMERS,
UNIFOaM COMMERCAL CODE § 24-22, at 402 (3d ed. 1988).
53 See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Religa, 999 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
obtaining a certificate of title was a necessary part of registration); General Motors Accept-
ance Corp. v. Rupp, 951 F.2d 283 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a car had not been "regis-
tered" despite issuance of a certificate of registration).
54 For another example of a system imperative overriding the clear, unambiguous
language of a statute, see LoPucki, supra note 4, at 1526 & n.139 (describing an error that
would have rendered mortgages and other liens dischargeable in bankruptcy, but which
the courts ignored).
55 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
56 See id. at 87.
1997] 493
CORAELL LAW REVIEW
of the bankruptcy laws."5 7 The Court made no attempt to explain the
source of the authority the bankruptcy judges would exercise from
June 28 to October 4. However, all concerned recognized the system
imperative of continuing to manage the over 600,000 cases pending in
the bankruptcy courts at the time.
When Congress failed to act by the deadline, the Supreme Court,
at the request of the Solicitor General, extended the stay ofjudgment
to December 24, 1982.58 Before that deadline expired, the Judicial
Conference of the United States proposed an emergency rule that was
adopted by each of the United States District Courts. 59 The rule pro-
vided for the bankruptcy judges to continue in office in a status simi-
lar to U.S. Magistrates, and for them to continue to manage their
caseloads under the authority of the districtjudges. The rule required
that some findings and orders of the bankruptcy judges be rubber
stamped by the district judges, but in practice even that often did not
occur. In reality, the same judges managed the same caseloads. Like
a character in a Road Runner cartoon, the bankruptcy courts had run
off the cliff-but had not fallen.
The leading bankruptcy scholars of the day quickly pronounced
the emergency rule unconstitutional, 60 as did nearly every bankruptcy
court that considered the issue.61 The district courts and the courts of
appeals, however, were unanimous in holding that the rule was consti-
tutional,62 and, for its part, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
every case. 65 The bankruptcy system continued to operate.
57 Id. at 88.
58 See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 813 (1982).
59 See WalterJ. Taggart, The New Bankruptcy Court System, 59 AM. BANKR. LJ. 231, 236
(1985) ("Subject to a variety of slight changes, the Emergency Rule was adopted and made
applicable throughout the country.").
60 See, e.g., Vern Countryman, Emergency Rule Compounds Emergency, 57 AM. BANKR. LJ.
1, 6 (1983) (describing the draft version of the proposed rule as "both invalid and unwork-
able"); Lawrence P. King, The Unmaking of a Bankruptcy Court: Aftermath of Northern Pipe-
line v. Marathon, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 99, 116 (1983) (discussing the Emergency Rule
and stating that "[t] he rule is invalid because it tries to do what the Supreme Court has said
Congress may not do").
61 See, e.g., Ellenberg v. Henry (In re Henry), 38 B.R. 24 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983) (hold-
ing bankruptcy jurisdiction established under emergency rule unconstitutional); In re
South Portland Shipyard, 31 B.R. 770 (Bankr. D. Me.) (holding the emergency rule to be
an invalid attempt to delegate power to the bankruptcy court), aftd, 32 B.R. 1012 (D. Me.
1983), vacated as moot sub nom. Romeo J. Ray, Inc. v. Northern Nat'l Bank (In re South
Portland Shipyard), 740 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1984); Color Craft Press, Ltd. v. Nationwide
Shopper Sys., Inc. (In re Color Craft Press, Ltd.), 27 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Utah), vacated, 27
B.R. 962 (D. Utah 1983); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In reRichardson), 27 B.R. 407
(Bankr. D. Utah 1983), vacated sub nom., Color Craft Press, Ltd. v. Nationwide Shopper Sys.,
Inc. (In re Color Craft Press, Ltd.), 27 B.R. 962 (D. Utah 1983).
62 See, e.g., National Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Price (In re Colorado Energy Supply
Inc.), 728 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding emergency rule constitutional).
63 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Hansen (In re Hansen), 702 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1983)
(holding the emergency rule constitutional).
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On June 28, 1984, as Congress was about to enact bankruptcy leg-
islation, the extension of the terms of all sitting bankruptcy judges
expired. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts an-
nounced that it would no longer pay the salaries of the bankruptcy
judges.64 Some bankruptcy judges did indeed play golf for a few
days,65 but most switched from their roles as quasi-magistrates to new
roles as "consultants."66 They continued to process cases, just as they
had when the bankruptcy courts existed in the eyes of the law.67
Twelve days later, Congress enacted legislation reappointing the bank-
ruptcyjudges and making the reappointments retroactive. 68 Constitu-
tional challenges to the legislation were uniformly rebuffed.69
One might explain these events as a series of decisions based on
the rule of law with the chips falling where they may; the courts in fact
did so. But these events make a great deal more sense if one also
considers the system imperative of 600,000 pending cases, and many
times that number of parties attempting to formulate both litigation
and business strategies in the face of the uncertainty generated by the
crisis. For the bankruptcy courts to be declared unconstitutional and
lose their jurisdiction was no great problem, but for them to cease
processing cases-for even a few days-would have caused a spillover
into the court system at large and then into numerous other law-re-
lated systems yielding unpredictable consequences. Moreover, partici-
pants cannot turn such a system off and on again without creating
massive waste. 70 In this case, as a result of the system imperative,
neither Congress nor the Supreme Court could shut the system
64 See David Lauter, Bankruptcy Law Spurs New Battle NAT'L L.J., July 23, 1984, at 3
(noting the "decision by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts not to pay the
$66,100 salaries of the country's 227 bankruptcy judges").
65 See id. (noting that "[b]ankruptcyjudges in Los Angeles and other parts of the 9th
Circuit were refusing to work last week while judges in Chicago were serving, at least tem-
porarily, without pay").
66 See id. (noting that in New York and Chicago, "the district and bankruptcy judges
decided to ignore Mr. Foley's letter," and quoting a bankruptcyjudge as saying "[w]e are
functioning as bankruptcy judges" and "[w]e've got ajob to do and we're trying to do it");
Bill Ott, Judicial Decision: Black Robes Traded for Business Suits, SAN DIEGO UNoN-TRIB., July
14, 1984, at B2 (describing a San Diego bankruptcy judge as wearing a business suit instead
of his judicial robe and "presiding over bankruptcy cases as a 'consultant'").
67 See Ott, supra note 66, at B2.
68 SeeAlec P. Ostrow, Constitutionality of Core Jurisdiction, 68 AM. Bs.Rut. L.J. 91, 92 n.6
(1994).
69 See, e.g., Bennyv. England (In reBenny), 812 F.2d 1133, 1142 (9th Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing the retroactive appointments valid).
70 See Paul C. Wohlmuth, Traveling the Highway: Sources of Momentum in Behavioral Regu-
lation, 6J. CoNTEMp. LEGAL IssuES 1, 1 (1995) (using a highway metaphor to develop the
proposition that concrete systems have momentum); id. at 8 (observing that "[t]he author-
ity regulating the driving of motor vehicles on the highway does not reside exclusively, or
even primarily, in the Motor Vehicle Code").
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down-regardless of the authority that these bodies possess under the
Constitution. 71
The effects of a system imperative are usually less dramatic than
they were in the bankruptcy court crisis. Ambiguity permeates the
law, and the recognition of system imperatives is a primary means of
resolving ambiguity. Faced with a question of interpretation, a judge
can examine the context-that is, the system-in which the problem
arises. 72 Often, the judge is able to see that one interpretation is con-
sistent with the smooth functioning of the system and the other inter-
pretation is disruptive.73
To the extent that anyone designs law-related systems, it is legal
scholars, legislatures, and courts. If those designers regard the sys-
tems they design as merely conceptual, their task is made easy. 74 They
need only express or imply the goals of the system in the laws they
propose, and avoid self-contradiction. Other error is impossible be-
cause the goals are achieved merely by promulgating the law. For ex-
ample, when the legislature declares it illegal for pigs to be in the
streets, it becomes illegal. If pigs remain in the streets, that is a defect
in the pigs, not in the law.75 If the system designer chooses to do so,
the designer could even deem the pigs not to be there, in which case
it would be the job ofjudges to ignore them.
If the designers regard the systems they design as concrete, rather
than as merely conceptual, and operationalize their goals, they make
their task more difficult. They must work within the physical limits of
the system and make the system work to accomplish an empirically
verifiable result. But by doing so, they make the system infinitely
more useful. The system can alter behavior and achieve concrete
goals rather than merely express ideas.
The task of designing a concrete system is made more difficult by
the hierarchical structure of systems. Recall that each system is typi-
71 My point is not that the bankruptcy courts inevitably had to continue in operation
during the crisis. Systems sometimes fail. My point is that a meaningful description of the
crisis-the only type of scholarly description that is really useful-cannot be given without
taking into account the imperatives of the concrete, law-related system involved.
72 The method described here is similar to the "dynamic statutory interpretation"
model proposed by Professor Eskridge in that both interpret statutes by reference to con-
text. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479
(1987). It is different, however, in that the context referred to in the method described
here is a system.
73 See infra Part IV (discussing National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n (In re Peregrine Entertain, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990)).
74 But see Stuart Banner, PleaseDon't Read the Title, 50 OHIO ST. LJ. 243 (1989) (provid-
ing an entertaining description of problems that can plague even the designer of a concep-
tual system).
75 See Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 899, 900-06 (describing




cally both the product of its subsystems and a component of larger
systems. Any change in the system must be evaluated not only for its
effects on the operation of that system, but also in terms of its effects
on the operation of related systems.76 Everything is connected to
everything else.
Consider, for example, the proposed change to Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which would require the filing of financ-
ing statements in the debtor's state of incorporation, rather than
where the collateral or the debtor is located.77 Analysis of this simple
change requires consideration not only of the systems by which filers
file financing statements 78 and searchers look for them,79 but also of
the effect on system interface with the systems for filing corporate
records,80 the local UCC filing systems,81 real estate filing systems,82
the system for filing against unincorporated debtors, 83 foreign filing
systems, 84 and state revenue raising systems. 85 An error or untoward
result in any of these interfaces might result in a malfunctioning
system.
III
SYST'EMs ANALYsIs As METHODOLOGY8 6
This Part presents a step-by-step guide to the application of sys-
tems analysis to law-related systems. The reader should keep in mind
that this guide presents only a few of the many ways of conducting
such analyses.
A. Step One: Identify the System To Be Analyzed
The initial tasks are to identify a system for study and to distin-
guish it from its environment. The ability to do this is based on the
premise of systems theory that phenomena, including social phenom-
76 For an elaboration of this point, see Henderson, Process Constraints, supra note 7, at
907-11 (discussing the "polycentric" planning problems resulting from the mutual interde-
pendency of issues, and arguing that these problems are unsuitable for the adjudicatory
process and instead should be addressed in the rulemaking process).
77 See LoPucki, Debtor's State, supra note 7 (discussing filing under Article 9 of the
UCC).
78 See id. at 593-611.
79 See id. at 615-19.
80 See id. at 619-20.
81 See id. at 620-22.
82 See id. at 623.
83 See id. at 623-25.
84 See id. at 625-30.
85 See id. at 630-32.
86 A "methodology" is "1 : a body of methods, rules, and postulates employed by a
discipline : a particular procedure or set of procedures 2 : the analysis of the principles or
procedures of inquiry in a particular field." WEBSTFR's NINTH, supra note 8, at 747.
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ena, organize themselves into systems. 87 The act of distinguishing a
social system from its environment is not whimsical; it indicates the
analyst's discovery of a testable, empirical fact. The structure of rela-
tively distinct systems, each composed of subsystems which are them-
selves composed of subsystems, is the natural structure of our
universe.88
Distinguishing social systems, including law-related systems, from
their environments is often difficult.8 9 Social systems are often inter-
woven in a rich, complex tapestry that can at first appear seamless. A
single actor, element, or subsystem may contribute simultaneously to
the functioning of several systems. 90
There are, nevertheless, at least three tools for making the dis-
tinction. They will be referred to here as the "human participant
test," the "interaction principle," and the "purpose principle." The
"human participant test" posits that any law-related system will include
one or more human beings. That is, to qualify as a "law-related sys-
tem," the system must to some degree engage in the promulgation or
enforcement of law. In the lexicon employed here, as in common
usage, when a law is implemented by embedding it in a physical sys-
tem, one ceases to think or speak of it as a law. When a road is
banked so that one cannot drive on it at speeds in excess of thirty
miles per hour, the system is physical; only when the rule is articulated
by judges and the legislatures for enforcement by the police and the
courts does it become law. It follows that virtually any law-related sys-
tem will consist at least in part of human beings whosejobs contribute
to the control of other human beings.
The analyst who begins with an issue or problem in mind, and
seeks to identify the relevant law-related system or systems, is likely to
find the "human participant test" particularly useful. "Where," the an-
alyst should inquire, "are there people who grapple with this issue at
least occasionally, if not in their daily lives?" If no one grapples with
the issue, then the analyst should suspect that the issue is purely con-
ceptual.91 Once the analyst identifies someone involved with the is-
87 See, e.g., LASZLO, supra note 5, at 30-32 (describing "natural systems").
88 See, e.g., id. at 30 (stating that the "concept natural system replaces the many mislead-
ing disjunctive names of natural entities... such as 'atoms,' [and] 'molecules.'").
89 Social systems are never entirely distinct from their environments. In systems ter-
minology, they are "open systems" engaged in continuous interaction with their environ-
ments. See id. at 102-03.
90 For example, a judge sitting in a court of general jurisdiction may function as part
of the tort system in hearing a tort case, as part of the criminal justice system in hearing a
criminal case, as part of the court system while participating in either or while carrying out
administrative tasks, and as part of the Kiwanis Club at lunch.
91 For example, on reading an early draft of my manuscript, Gary Schwartz raised the
issue of flag burning. We were able to identify at least five kinds of people concerned with
the issue: those who wished to bum flags as political protests, those who wished to prevent
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sue, the analyst need only see who and what that person interacts with
to discover the shape of the entire system.
Both the "interaction" and "purpose" principles are derived from
the definition of a "system" as "a set of interrelated and interactive
elements that work together to accomplish specific purposes." 92 The
"interaction principle" holds that the persons and things that form a
system interact more closely and more frequently among themselves
than they do with persons and things in their environment. Systems
can be defined more or less expansively by varying the degree of close-
ness or frequency of interaction required to define a person or thing
as included in the system. The only limitation that must be observed
is that persons and things with less interaction cannot be included if
persons and things with more interaction are excluded.
The "purpose principle" holds that persons and things that are
necessary to the functioning of the system-that is, to the accomplish-
ment of system goals-are included. Those that are unnecessary are
excluded.
One can begin the process of defining the scope of a system with
either a purpose or a system in mind. For example, assume one
wishes to define the scope of the law-related system or systems by
which money that is lent is recovered. One might interview lenders
and ask them how they recover the money they lend. They probably
would tell the interviewer that most borrowers repay "voluntarily." By
asking about payments that are not made voluntarily, the interviewer
might discover the system that processes civil litigation and ultimately
sends the sheriff out to seize property. The interviewer probably
would also discover the bankruptcy system that liquidates debtors'
property and sometimes sends checks to creditors in the mail; collec-
tion agencies that accept assignments of claims, pester the debtors un-
til some of them pay, and then reassign the unpaid claims back to the
creditors; and outlaw enforcers who threaten people and sometimes
break their kneecaps. 93
Has the interviewer discovered one system, or many? To answer
this question, the systems analyst examines the relationships among
the people and things involved in each of these putative systems. Do
them from doing so, the American Civil Liberties Union, the courts, and lawyers who han-
dle the cases. We concluded that several systems are in operation and that to identify them
we would have to discover more about how members of these groups interact with one
another.
92 GIBSON & HUGHES, supra note 5, at 5.
93 The analysis described here is loosely based on a study currently under way by
Ronald Mann. RONALD J. MANN, STRATEGY AND FORCE IN THE LIQUIDATION OF SECURED
DEBT 18-25 (Washington Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 97-3-4, 1997) (describing
the process followed by a finance company for terminating inventory loans without invok-
ing the legal collection system).
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the people in the civil litigation system relate more closely to others in
the civil litigation system than they do to people in the bankruptcy
system? Do either relate significantly to collection agencies or outlaw
enforcers? Assume this empirical inquiry yields three results. First,
people and things involved in any one of the four processes have sub-
stantially more interaction with people and things within their own
process than with people and things outside that process. From this,
the analyst can conclude that there are four systems in operation. Sec-
ond, people and things in three of these systems-civil litigation,
bankruptcy, and collection agencies-have moderate levels of interac-
tion with people and things in the other of these three processes, but
lower levels of interaction with people and things outside them. From
these first two results, the analyst can conclude that it might be useful
to regard the three systems as subsystems of a larger system I will call
the "legal collection system. '94 Third, assume that the empirical in-
quiry discovers that the people and things in the outlaw enforcement
system have little or nothing to do with the people and things in the
other three systems. That is, different lenders and borrowers are in-
volved, and the people in the outlaw enforcement process have little
or no contact with people in the other three processes. From this
result, one can conclude that the outlaw collection system is not part
of the legal collection system.95
Having empirically distinguished three subsystems of the legal
collection system from their environment using the "interaction prin-
ciple," the analyst can refine the distinction by applying the "purpose
principle." With regard to the bankruptcy system, application of the
"purpose principle" yields what some may consider a surprising result:
the bankruptcy system has numerous other purposes in addition to
just collecting money for creditors. It seeks, for example, to give indi-
vidual debtors a "fresh start," free of their debt, and to reduce the
debt of business debtors to levels sufficiently low that the viable
among them can continue to operate and, among other things, pro-
vide jobs to their employees, provide markets to their suppliers, and
pay taxes to government.
Recognition of these additional purposes should not dramatically
alter the analyst's judgment as to where the boundaries of the bank-
ruptcy system lie. To some degree, the analyst determined those
boundaries by observing the levels of interaction among people and
94 E.g., LoPucki, State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, supra note 7, at 312 (treating the
state remedies and bankruptcy system as subsystems of a single coercive collection system).
95 The distinction is not based on the fact that one system is prohibited by law and the
other is not. Rather, it is based on the lack of interaction between the two. If, for example,
it were shown that drug smuggling is an integral part of the system that has as its main
purpose the enforcement of laws against drug smuggling, then the two would be consid-
ered a single system.
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things; those levels have not changed. But considering the crude
methods the analyst probably employed to discover those interactions,
the analyst should expect recognition of these additional purposes to
lead to new discoveries or revised judgments about the levels of those
interactions. The analyst's reassessment of the empirical reality is a
second application of the "interaction principle," which can put the
analyst in a better position to make a second application of the "pur-
pose principle." The process can be repeated until the analyst is con-
fident of having discovered the natural system boundaries.
The process described here is likely to lead to the discovery of a
range of possible systems for investigation, rather than a single one.
For example, one interested in the issues of alimony and child sup-
port might identify any of the following systems for study: the system
for coercing the payment of alimony and child support, the system for
providing support to dependent persons (including public and volun-
tary private support), the system for obtaining and enforcing divorce
decrees, or even the family as a system. Each may in fact be a system
that satisfies all three tests discussed here. That the analyses of these
various systems may lead to different conclusions demonstrates the
flexibility rather than the weakness of the method. The accuracy of
the analysis depends on whether the analyst has defined the system
broadly enough to take into account all of the material factors.
Systems theorists recognize that where one draws the line be-
tween a system and its environment is often somewhat arbitrary. For
example, the bankruptcy courts are clearly part of the bankruptcy sys-
tem. So are the books and newsletters that convey information about
the activities of these courts, and the judges and practitioners who use
the books and newsletters. The district courts and courts of appeals-
both of which hear appeals from the bankruptcy court-can be re-
garded as part of the bankruptcy system or as part of the environment
in which the bankruptcy system functions, depending on the level of
interaction the analyst requires for inclusion.
The problem of deciding what level of interaction to require in
the definition of a system is analogous to the problem of what altitude
to require in the definition of a mountain. Depending on the defini-
tion employed, the boundary of a mountain can be anywhere from its
peak to a point well below sea level. Geographers solve the problem
by drawing contour maps that show what land is above each of several
altitudes, leaving it to the user of the map to define the mountain
however the user wishes. Depending on the level of interaction re-
quired of a system, the boundary of the system can likewise expand or
contract. Theoretically, it should be possible for systems analysts to
draw contour maps of systems, showing where the boundaries would
be at various levels of interaction. The key point is that the existence
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of the widely acknowledged "boundary problem" in systems analysis96
should be no more troubling than the problem of defining a moun-
tain. The analyst's inability to specify a precise boundary for either
without first somewhat arbitrarily fixing an altitude or level of interac-
tion should not cast doubt on the existence of either the mountain or
the system.
B. Step Two: Attribute Goals to the System
Understanding of a law-related system is achieved through a dia-
lectic. The analyst tentatively attributes goals 9 7 to the system based on
observations of its operation and evaluates the operation in terms of
its ability to achieve the attributed goals. The dialectic repeats until
the analyst is satisfied that the analyst's understanding of a system's
goals is consistent with what the system is doing to achieve them. Be-
cause law-related systems are engaged in constant exchanges with
their environments, they never reach equilibrium. Hence, there is no
expectation that the system's operation will ever be completely consis-
tent with the system's goals. The analyst almost inevitably discovers
some malfunction in the system and can suggest some possibilities for
improving it.
To yield a useful analysis, the analyst should state the goals of a
law-related system in concrete terms so that the analyst can operation-
alize and empirically test whether the system is achieving them. Such
goals might be, for example, to deter crime, to promote invention, to
encourage the free exchange of ideas, or to enable viable companies
that are unable to pay their debts to continue to operate.
There are essentially two methods for attributing goals to a law-
related system, the "positive" and the "normative." The positive
method is to observe the operation of the system, determine what re-
sults it is in fact bringing about, and then to assume that it intends to
bring about those results. Careful empirical observation of a law-re-
lated system almost always reveals that the system is doing things and
producing results that participants in the system did not intend or
anticipate.98 Systems-oriented sociologists refer to them as "latent
96 See, e.g., WEINBERG, supra note 5, at 144-50 (describing the problem of identifying
the boundary between system and environment). "Boundary" is the metaphor employed
almost universally in systems analysis. "Contour" might have been a better choice.
97 The words "goal" and "purpose" are used interchangeably throughout this Article.
Both are used because "goal" seems to be the word of choice in systems analysis, while
"purpose" is the word of choice in law. The underlying concept seems to me to be
identical.
98 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping
in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. Rlv. 11 (re-
porting the discovery of rampant forum shopping that led to higher attorneys' fees and
delay). Of course, the lawyers and clients engaged in forum shopping were aware of their
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functions."99 Despite their unexpected nature, it is appropriate to
treat these results as intended. Recall that the search is for the goals of
the system, not the goals of the system's participants or even the sys-
tem's designers.
A positive attribution of goals can be helpful in mapping the sys-
tem and determining how it functions. It can contribute only indi-
rectly, however, to generating. proposals for reform. When a system's
outputs are assumed to be its goals, the system usually will prove to be
a very effective means of achieving them. Generating proposals for
reform requires that the analyst discover some tension between the
system's function and its goals. The analyst will rarely be able to ac-
complish this through the positive attribution of goals. In this respect,
the positive attribution of goals is tautological.
The "normative method" of attributing goals to a law-related sys-
tem consists of the analyst deciding what the analyst thinks the goals
of the system should be. Such goals are arbitrary, but if the user of the
analysis-typically a legislator or a judge-shares them, the analysis
can nevertheless be useful. The analysis will show what changes are
necessary'for the system to achieve the desired goals. In a variant of
the "normative method," the analyst attributes the express goals of the
system designer or some other person to the system. For example, the
analyst might seek to determine how well a statutorily-created system
is achieving the goals expressed by the legislature. Although the re-
sulting analysis is based on particular normative assumptions, it can
still result in an objective, positive determination of how the system
would have to be changed to achieve the goals. That determination
is, however, of little use to one who does not share the normative
assumption.
C. Step Three: Determine the Structure and Function of the
System
"Systems theory" holds that a system will be composed of discrete
subsystems that combine to accomplish the system's goals. The analyt-
ical task is to discover and analyze those subsystems. Because the sub-
own activity and undoubtedly intended most of the results they produced. Rarely would
the consequences of purposeful social activity be unknown to anyone.
99 See, e.g., ROBERT K. MERTON, SocIAL THEORY AND SocIAL STRucTuRE 63 (1957) (de-
fining "latent function" to mean the system's "unintended and unrecognized conse-
quences"). But see Colin Campbell, A Dubious Distinction? An Inquiy into the Value and Use of
Merton's Concepts of Manifest and Latent Function, 47 AM. Soc. REv. 29 (1982) (arguing that
the distinction between manifest and latent functions has not proven useful in sociology).
Legal scholars have readily accepted the notion that rules of law frequently serve latent
functions. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 3, at 2083 (referring to legal scholarship as "digging




systems are themselves systems, the analyst can expect that most will
be composed of subsystems. The analysis of a law-related system
should include as many levels of subsystems as are unique to the sys-
tem. That is, at some level in the investigation of the bankruptcy sys-
tem, the subsystems are no longer unique to bankruptcy. They may
be, for example, computer programs that could manage nonban-
kruptcy material as well as bankruptcy material, people who are not
specialized to bankruptcy, or courtrooms that can be used for a variety
of purposes.
Methodologies are useful in large part, because they provide the
researcher with a set of questions to ask about the subject of study.
Systems analysis provides two general lines of inquiry capable of illu-
minating nearly any system. First, what subfunctions must be per-
formed for this system to function? By answering this question the
analyst generates ideas on where to look for subsystems. For example,
one of the goals of the bankruptcy reorganization system is to distin-
guish the financially distressed businesses that can be restored to prof-
itability from those that cannot. The technique of systems analysis
suggests that the analyst attempt to determine how the system makes
that distinction. The method of inquiry will likely be "soft" empiri-
cism; the analyst either talks to people in the system or observes the
system in operation. 100 The analyst may already know, for example,
that debtors have internal mechanisms for determining whether to
attempt to continue in operation, the most prominent being the col-
lection and review of accounting data, and the projection of future
profitability based on historical data. The analyst may discover that
bankruptcy judges are sometimes called upon to decide whether a
business should be permitted to continue in operation. 0 1 In some
cases, this occurs at the insistence of creditors' committees.10 2 Know-
ing that, the analyst can inquire into how the creditors' committee
reaches its decision to request a decision from the judge. Such an
inquiry is likely to lead to other processes that either furnish financial
information from which the committees can make that decision or
100 See, e.g., GIBSON & HUGHES, supra note 5, at 149-59 (describing methods of collect-
ing the data necessary to design an information system for a private firm, including inter-
viewing, searching data archives, making personal observation, and conducting on-site
work sampling).
101 For two empirical studies suggesting that bankruptcy judges perform this function
only rarely, see Jerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Controk A Case for Adoption of the
Trustee System, 70 MARQ. L. Ra,. 159, 169 (1987) ("An examination of unsecured creditors'
efforts in Milwaukee supports the finding in Kansas City of unsecured creditors' general
inability to close nonviable businesses."); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-
Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? 57 Am. BANR. L.J. 247, 263-66 (1983)
(finding only a single case in which the court had ordered the closing of the business).
102 Typically this will occur on a motion brought by some other party, with the Com-
mittee in opposition to a closing of the business.
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that enables them to make the decision without financial information.
The empirical nature of the inquiry allows the analyst to determine
not just what subsystems exist, but how frequently each is used, and
how well each works.
The second line of inquiry regards the system under investigation
as a subsystem of a larger system. It asks what that larger system is and
how the system under investigation contributes to the larger system's
functioning. In the course of such inquiries into "how it works," the
analyst discovers how the various components of the systems relate to
one another.
The functioning of a law-related system will always include some
exchange between the system and its environment. The analyst
should be conscious of these exchanges, because the changes the ana-
lyst recommends may disrupt them.
D. Step Four: Describe or Depict the Relationships Among
System Components
Every scholarly effort involves a trade-off between complexity and
manageability. That is, the effort would benefit from the recognition
of the greater complexity in the subject matter, but at some point fur-
ther recognition of complexity renders the work unwieldy and less
useful.103
The great strength of systems analysis is its ability to deal with this
tradeoff. It accomplishes the tradeoff through an efficient presenta-
tion of complexity. Probably the two most common applications of
systems analysis today are in financial accounting and computer pro-
gram design. 104 In these fields, the interrelationships among the com-
ponents of the system are far too complex for the human mind to
comprehend in their entirety. The designer needs external aids to
keep track of the work and to communicate with others'about
problems and ideas. Not surprisingly, much of the effort in the field
of systems analysis is devoted to the development of methods for
describing or depicting complex interrelationships. These come in
103 Posner recognizes the fundamental difficulty with complete, accurate description
in scholarship. E.g., Richard A. Posner, The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Eco-
nomics, 149 J. INsrTmoNAL & THEORICA. EcoN. 73, 74 (1993) (criticizing Willard
Hurst's book on the history of the lumber industry in Wisconsin as "a dense mass of de-
scription-lucid, intelligent, and I am sure scrupulously accurate, but so wanting in a theo-
retical framework-in a perceptible point-as to be virtually unreadable"). Later in his
article, Posner attempts to force this tradeoff into a dichotomy between "efficient theory"
and "case studies," that is, facts. Id. at 78-79. But a theory is nothing more than a method
of ordering facts; it is no better or worse than the factual basis on which it is constructed.
See Lynn M. LoPucki, Reorganization Realities, Methodological Realities, and the Paradigm Domi-
nance Game, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1307, 1309-10 (1994).
104 See, e.g., BURCH, supra note 5; GIBSON & HUGHES, supra note 5.
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the form of protocols for diagramming, 0 5 flow charting, 0 6 drafting
algorithms, and writing "pseudo-code." Pioneers like Professor Ed-
ward R. Tufte of Yale have taken the art of envisioning information to
new heights.' 0 7
E. Step Five: Identify Inconsistencies Between Goals and
Functions
If the analysis performed is in any part normative, then the analy-
sis may discover inconsistencies between the goals of the system and
what is being done to achieve them. For example, assume that a goal
of the debt collection system is to enable judgment creditors to collect
the amounts specified in their judgments, subject to the overriding
goal that the collection not deprive debtors of certain property
deemed to be necessary for their continued well-being ("exempt prop-
erty"). If the analysis discovers either that some judgment creditors
are unable to collect their debts, even though collection could be ac-
complished without depriving the debtor of exempt property or that
some debtors are deprived of exempt property as part of the collec-
tion process, then the system is apparently malfunctioning. The ana-
lyst might respond by examining cases in which the apparent
malfunction occurred. The analyst might discover, for example, that
debtors are deprived of exempt property because they do not claim
their exemptions. Inquiring further, the analyst might discover that
they do not claim their exemptions because they are unaware of the
necessity to make such a claim. At this point, the analyst might con-
sider whether the debtor's making a claim is necessary to the function-
ing of the system. If the claim serves a sufficiently important purpose
that it cannot be dispensed with, then the analyst might consider the
addition of a subsystem that would notify the debtor of the necessity to
make the claim. Alternatively, the analyst might consider a change in
the putative goals of the system to add economy of operation-just a
way of saying that the system has decided not to pay for something it
ideally would want. What is critical is that the problems are addressed
directly and decisions are made expressly-on what may be a tremen-
dous number of issues. The capacity of systems analysis to accommo-
date complexity makes this possible.
105 See BURGH, supra note 5, at 36-42 (describing the process of creating a data flow
diagram); id. at 57-58 (discussing the use of Warnier-Orr diagrams); id. at 58-61 (discussing
Jackson diagrams); GIBSON & HUGHES, supra note 5, at 251-68 (describing the "Data Flow
Diagram (DED) Modeling Method"); id. at 48-46 (discussing entity relationship diagrams
(ERDs).
106 See BURGH, supra note 5, at 52-53 (discussing structured program flowcharts).
107 E.g., EDWARD R. TUFrE, ENVISIONING INFORMATION (1990); EDWARD R. TUFr-E, THE
VISUAL DISPlAY OF QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION (1983).
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Strategic analysis is another technique for discovering internal in-
consistencies and other weaknesses in systems designed to control
human behavior. The law-related system may be thought of as operat-
ing according to a set of rules. As participants in the system seeking
advantage, they develop and execute strategies. Strategic analysis ex-
amines those strategies as a means of understanding the system.'08
In essence, strategic analysis is a modern-day adaptation of Oliver
Wendell Holmes's "bad man" theory of the law. Holmes argued that
the meaning of a law might be best understood by the use that a bad
man might make of it.109 In systems terms, Holmes's bad man is re-
placed by a strategist. The strategist may be either a real person,
whose actual strategies are observed by the system analyst," 0 or a hy-
pothetical person."' The strategist modifies his or her conduct to
seek advantages from the system. If the strategist is able to bring
about "system-unintended" results, the strategist thereby demonstrates
the need for changes in the system.
Strategic analysis works only if the system under investigation is a
concrete, law-related system, as opposed to a conceptual system of
laws. As nearly every law student realizes by the end of the first year,
brightjudges are not significantly constrained by conceptual law. The
judge who realizes that a strategist is manipulating the system can al-
ways find sufficient flexibility in rules of law or in equitable doctrine to
deny the system-unintended result. When law is viewed as merely a
conceptual system, the consequence, as Professor Lon Fuller noted in
108 Douglass C. North applies a similarly bifurcated approach to understanding eco-
nomic systems:
Conceptually, what must be clearly differentiated are the rules from the
players. The purpose of the rules is to define the way the game is played.
But the objective of the team within that set of rules is to win the game ....
Modeling the strategies and the skills of the team as it develops is a separate
process from modeling the creation, evolution, and consequences of the
rules.
NORTH, supra note 45, at 4-5.
109 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 171
(1920) (observing that "if you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as
a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables
him to predict").
110 See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credi 110 HARv. L. REV.
625, 668-83 (1997) (describing, based on interviews, the strategies employed by lenders
and borrowers in response to transaction costs); RonaldJ. Mann, The First Shall Be Last: A
Contextual Argument for Abandoning Temporal Rules of Lien Priority, 75 TEx. L. Rxv. 11 (1996)
(analyzing the mechanics lien system by empirical observation of the strategies employed
in it).
111 See, e.g. LYNN M. LoPuca, STRATEGIES FOR CEDTrroRs IN BANKRuuPTcy PROCEEDINGS




response to Holmes's bad man theory of the law, is that strategy never
works.112
That legal strategy does work demonstrates the fallacy in the
traditional approach to law as a purely conceptual system. If the ana-
lyst views law as merely one element of a law-related system that also
has physical and autonomous law elements, the analyst can begin to
see the limitations on judicial action that give rise to legal strategy.
They include "process constraints" that prevent the law from taking
particular matters into account or providing certain kinds of reme-
dies.1 3 Judges are not always free to attempt to restore the world to
the state it was in before the execution of the strategy. A clever strate-
gist can place a judge in such a position that the judge will choose
validation of a system-unintended strategy over the available
alternatives.
For example, taxicab companies judgment-proof their operations
by dividing the operations among numerous corporations, often with
only one or two cabs in each. Viewing law purely conceptually, such a
scheme should not work. At the behest of any injured person, the
court would disregard the separate existence of corporations used in
this manner and impose liability on the owners. Nevertheless, this
flimsy judgment-proofing strategy has been successful enough to sur-
vive more than three decades of earnest veil piercing." 4 Among the
hypotheses that might explain the success of the taxi companies' strat-
egy are: (1) many plaintiffs' attorneys do not have sufficient skill or
motivation to bring the necessary issues before the courts; (2) the
strategy does not work in litigated cases, but the cost of building the
judgment-proof structure is nevertheless justified by the discounts
achieved in settled cases; (3) some judges decline to disregard the
separate corporate entity, because they regard the building of such
112 LON L. FULLER, THE LAw iN QuEsr OF ITSELF 92-95 (1940) (arguing that to under-
stand what judges will do, Holmes's bad man would have to "look at the law through the
eyes of a good man"). For further development of this point, see LoPucki, supra note 4, at
1545-47.
113 See, e.g., Henderson, Process Constraints, supra note 7, at 907-11 (describing a class of
"polycentric" problems that "cannot be addressed effectively by the traditional adjudicatory
process").
114 Recently, a court noted that:
[In a 1966 opinion] Judge Fuld observed the existence of "what appears to
be a rather common practice in the taxicab industry of vesting the owner-
ship of a taxi fleet in many corporations, each owning only one or two
cabs." This Court has conferenced over fifteen hundred motor vehicle ac-
tions over the last four months, many of which involve taxicab corporations,
and notes that this method of conducting business remains a common
practice in the taxicab industry to this day.
Goldberg v. Lee Express Cab Corp., 634 N.Y.S.2d 337, 338 n.1 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (citations
omitted) (quoting Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 416 (1966)).
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judgment-proof structures as system-intended strategy; 115 and (4) dis-
regard of the corporate veil does not lead to recovery, but merely to
the extension of liability to other entities that either are already judg-
ment-proof or that become so after the injury that gives rise to the
action. This type of strategic analysis, documented through empiri-
cism, can illuminate the actual mechanisms by which the system
operates.
IV
CURRENT APPLICATION OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS IN THE COURTS
Systems analysis builds upon traditional methods of analyzing the
law.116 Law students are taught to search for the latent policy or value
in an opinion of the court; 17 often that policy or value is consistency
with the functioning of the law-related system. Judicial opinions today
often refer to the "purposes," if not the "goals," of the laws they imple-
ment,1 8 and judges at least sometimes discuss the effects of their deci-
sions on the functioning of the legal system or the affected law-related
system.
For example, in National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n,"19 the court addressed whether the holder of a copyright
115 See, for example, Radazewski v. Telecom Corp.:
The doctrine of limited liability is intended precisely to protect a parent
corporation whose subsidiary goes broke. That is the whole purpose of the
doctrine, and those who have the right to decide such questions, that is,
legislatures, believe that the doctrine, on the whole, is socially reasonable
and useful. We think that the doctrine would largely be destroyed if a par-
ent corporation could be held liable simply on the basis of errors in busi-
ness judgment.
981 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1992). Even if such a strategy is not system-intended, particular
legal communities may share a mental model in which it is. See LoPucki, supra note 4, at
1516-21.
116 Probably the best formal justification for the use of systems analysis in judicial deci-
sionmaking is Professor Eskridge's theory of "dynamic statutory interpretation." Eskridge
argues for interpretation of statutes "in light of their present societal, political, and legal
context." Eskridge, supra note 72, at 1479. Eskridge's examples make clear that what he is
in effect doing is discovering the current purposes or goals of the systems that will be
affected by an interpretation and making the interpretation give effect to the purposes or
goals. Id. at 1484-88 (finding deterrence of civil rights violations by officers to be a vibrant
purpose that justifies punitive damages under § 1983).
117 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 3, at 2082 ("'Search for the Latent Policy or Value and
Make it Explicit'-has (in tandem with the older classical mode of finding latent princi-
pIes) been the overwhelmingly dominant mode of both scholarship and teaching since the
1940s.").
118 See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (stating that
the "purposes" of the patent system are "to foster and reward invention... [to] promote[ ]
disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to prac-
tice the invention once the patent expires . . . [and] to assure that ideas in the public
domain remain there for the free use of the public"). For an additional example, see supra
note 115.
119 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
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could perfect a security interest in the copyright by filing with either
the state UCC filing office or the United States Copyright Office or
could only perfect the security interest by filing with the latter. After
examining both state and federal laws concerning the issue, Judge
Kozinski addressed the systems aspect of the problem:
A recordation scheme best serves its purpose where interested
parties can obtain notice of all encumbrances by referring to a sin-
gle, precisely defined recordation system. The availability of paral-
lel state recordation systems that could put parties on constructive
notice as to encumbrances on copyrights would surely interfere with
the effectiveness of the federal recordation scheme.' 20
In this passage, Judge Kozinski's focus is on what kind of system would
work best. He then finds, within legal doctrine, a peg on which to
hang his systems analysis. "Given the virtual absence of dual recorda-
tion schemes in our legal system, Congress cannot be presumed to
have contemplated such a result. The court therefore concludes that
any state recordation system pertaining to interests in copyrights
would be preempted by the Copyright Act."'12
In a footnote to the opinion, Judge Kozinski returned to the issue
of what system would work best. He noted that the Copyright Office
employed antiquated methods that would cause filing there to be, on
the facts of the case before him, about a hundred times as expensive
as filing in the state system. This time, however, he concluded that
the problems with the system's functioning were outside his
jurisdiction:
This technical shortcoming of the copyright filing system does
make it a less useful device for perfecting a security interest in copy-
right libraries. Nevertheless, this problem is not so serious as to
make the system unworkable. In any event, this is the system Con-
gress has established and the court is not in a position to order
more adequate procedures. If the mechanics of filing turn out to
pose a serious burden, it can be taken up by Congress during its
oversight of the Copyright Office or, conceivably, the Copyright Of-
fice might be able to ameliorate the problem through exercise of its
regulatory authority. 122
Judge Kozinski is correct both in his criticism of the functioning
of the Copyright Office filing system and in his conclusion that fixing
it is beyond his authority. He recognizes that he is himself part of
another system-the court system-whose function is limited to de-
120 Id. at 201.
121 Id. at 201-02.
122 Id. at 202 n.10.
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ciding cases. Courts are not equipped to administer filing offices; 12 3
nor is it their proper role to move filings from one office to another
because the first office is not going to do a good job in processing
them. There is an organized system for making such changes, and it
delegates the responsibility for the problem to legislators and regula-
tors. 124 Judge Kozinski simply remarks on these facts.
Although Judge Kozinski's systems analysis probably reaches the
correct result-creditors taking security interests in copyrights should
file in the Copyright Office and not in the state UCC system-his anal-
ysis is incomplete in at least one crucial respect. He supposes that
after his decision, creditors taking security interests in copyrights will
only have to file in the Copyright Office and can ignore the state UCC
system. Post-Peregine commentary suggests the contrary. Conservative
practice requires dual filing on the chance that Peregrine will not apply
or will not be followed.125 An empirical inquiry into the closely analo-
gous practice of filing security interests in trademarks, where the re-
ported opinions unanimously hold that only state filing is required, 126
found that commentators continued to recommend dual filings, 2 7
and secured creditors continued to make them.' 28 Such dual filing
probably existed in the copyright system prior to Judge Kozinski's de-
cision and probably continued after it. Given that fixing the dual fil-
ing problem was beyond his power and would require legislative
action, Judge Kozinski's decision voiding the security interest in the
case before him is questionable.
123 See Henderson, Process Constraints, supra note 7 (describing limitations of the adjudi-
cative process).
124 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 3-5 (1985)
(discussing the reasons for, and appropriate limits of, judicial lawmaking).
125 See, e.g., Henry Beck, The Development, Financing and Acquisition of Information Age
Assets, 12 COMPUTER LAw. 14, 17 (1995) ("The careful lawyer will record his security inter-
est in unpatented copyrightable computer software both with the U.S. Copyright Office
and under the Uniform Commercial Code.").
126 See, e.g., In re TR-3 Indus., 41 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that
the Lanham Act does not require federal filing against trademarks); In re Roman Cleanser
Co., 43 B.R. 940, 943-44 (Bankr. E.D. Micli. 1984) (holding that filings against trademarks
are to be in the U.C.C. filing system, not the federal trademark filing system).
127 For example, two prominent commentators note that:
Although it is clear that applicable state law governs the creation and fore-
closure of security interests in trademarks, it is considered unclear whether
the perfection and priority of those security interests are governed by fed-
eral law.... or state law .... Accordingly, many practitioners now conduct
dual state and federal lien filings against trademarks.
Lee A. Schott & Harry C. Sigman, Preliminary Discussion Draft of Proposed Changes to Article 9
Relating to Treatment of Security Interests in Intellectual Property, 878 ALI-ABA 415, 426 (1993).
128 See George Chih-Lun Yu, Security Interests in Federally Registered Trademarks:
The Double Filing Problem and a Proposal for a State-Based Perfection System 15 (1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding that 80 of 81 sets of assignors/





SOME EXAMPLES OF SYSTEMS PROJECTS
This Part sets forth four examples of how the systems approach
can lead to better analyses of law-related systems. The first three ex-
amples are completed projects; the fourth is a proposed project.
A. Formulating Proposals for Reform: The Controversy over
Place of Filing
Creditors who take a security interest in certain kinds of person-
alty must file notice of the interest in a public filing system maintained
by the state. If more than one state is involved in the transaction, the
law must specify the state in which the filing should be made. For
decades, the law specified filing in the jurisdiction where the collat-
eral was located or the jurisdiction in which the residence or chief
executive office of the debtor was located, depending on the type of
collateral involved.1 29 The law included complex provisions to deal
with the possibility that the collateral or the debtor might move while
the security interest remained outstanding. 30
Based on a systems analysis in 1995, I proposed that the law spec-
ify the debtor's state of incorporation as the proper place to file.' 3 '
The analysis proceeded essentially as follows. I identified the system
to be analyzed as the system by which filers filed financing statements
and searchers sought to discover them. 3 2 I attributed to the system
the goal of communicating the existence of a security interest from
the filer to the searcher at minimum cost.'3 3 In my analysis, I discov-
ered the following subsystems: (1) subsystems by which filers deter-
mined where to file, verified that they filed in the right place, and
prepared to prove later that they filed in the right place; 34 (2) subsys-
tems by which searchers determined where to search; 3 5 and (3) sub-
systems by which filers and searchers determined how to deal with
changes in the circumstance that determined the correct place to file
or search.' 3 6 I described the functioning of the system in an article 3 7
and prepared a two-page table comparing the subsystem functions of
the three alternative systems under consideration.138 I concluded that
the goals of this system could be achieved less expensively if the system
129 See, e.g., U.G.C. § 9-103 (1995).
130 See id.
131 LoPucki, Debtor's State, supra note 7, at 647-55.
132 Id. at 582.
'33 Id.
'34 Id. at 593-611.
'35 Id. at 615-19.
136 Id. at 611-15.
'37 Id. at 593-636.
138 Id. at 660-61.
[Vol. 82:479
SYSTEMS APPROACH
were based on filing at the place of incorporation. This proposal has
been adopted by the American Law Institute's Article 9 Drafting Com-
mittee and is part of the current draft of the proposed revision.' 3 9
B. Replacing Legal Systems with Physical Systems: The Case of
Payment Systems
Professor Ronald Mann is preparing a set of teaching materials
that tracks the evolution of modem payment systems from checks
through credit cards, to electronic funds transfers and e-money.140
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of this evolution has been the
use of physical-in this case electronic-components to replace legal
components of the payment system. For example, the checking sys-
tem verified the existence of the payor's funds by physically moving
the check through the bank clearing system. Because substantial time
elapsed, numerous parties were involved, and reliance interests began
to accrue. Complex law developed to fix liability on the various par-
ties, including criminal liability for fraudulent or worthless checks, to
fix "midnight deadlines" for bank processing, to provide warranties on
transfers during the collection process, and to determine when trans-
actions became final. Newer systems verify the existence of the
payor's funds electronically before the transferee gives value, reducing
the need for legal rules to a small fraction of those required for check-
ing. The new payment systems perform the same function as the old
systems, assigning funds on deposit from one entity to another, but
physical attributes of the new systems have replaced legal attributes of
the old ones.
There are many circumstances in which physical systems are
more effective in controlling human behavior than legal systems. For
example, a few decades ago, the theft of social security checks from
mailboxes was a major problem. The system might have responded
with more laws, more law enforcement, and harsher penalties. In-
stead, it responded by directly depositing the social security check in
the payee's bank account, which solved the problem. Systems analysis
can assist in identifying other areas in which effective physical systems
can replace ineffective laws. Once the analyst determines what func-
tions law performs in the law-related system, the analyst can more eas-
ily imagine physical systems that might substitute for law.
139 U.C.C. §§ 9-103(a) (4) (i) (Discussion Draft 1996).
140 RonaldJ. Mann, Payment and Credit Systems (Spring 1997) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
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C. Comparing Legal Systems: The Case of United States and
Canadian Bankruptcy Reorganizations
Comparative law scholars are struggling with the problem that
has come to be known as "cultural translation.' 4' It is difficult for an
observer of phenomena that occur in one cultural context to translate
a description of the phenomena in a manner which makes them com-
prehensible to a participant in another culture. When the phenom-
ena are legal, the problem is compounded, because each culture is
likely to describe its phenomena only in legal doctrine. The doctrine
will probably describe what is actually occurring only poorly. A literal
translation between doctrines will likely yield nonsense. To translate
effectively, the translator has to be aware notjust of the special mean-
ings of words when they are employed in the "legal" sense, but also of
actual practices that may not be described in the doctrine at all-or
that may even be contrary to the doctrine. 42
Systems analysis can facilitate cross-cultural comparison by pro-
viding an easily translatable framework for describing the operation of
a law-related system. The framework translates easily because events
are described in terms that are operationalized and empirically verifia-
ble. For example, the analyst who seeks to compare the criminal jus-
tice systems of two countries can focus on what physical conduct leads
to imprisonment, what steps are taken when a person is accused, and
the physical conditions of imprisonment. There are also a growing
number of technologies and institutions that cut across cultures and
that can provide trans-cultural concepts for comparison. For exam-
ple, money is denominated differently in different cultures, but the
concept of a credit that can be transferred in payment is the same
from one culture to another.
The systems approach to comparison is most powerful when the
analyst has direct empirical evidence of how each system functions. In
the absence of direct empirical evidence, the analyst can derive useful
information from judicial opinions, legislative history, the language of
statutes, interviews with participants in the system,' 43 and other de-
scriptions that link the facts of cases with legal outcomes. But these
kinds of materials must be used cautiously, because they may reflect
141 Compare 0. Kahn-Freund, Comparative Law as an Academic Subject, 82 LAw Q. Ruv. 40,
45 (1966) (observing that countries may respond to identical economic and social needs
through very different legal and extra-legal techniques that are determined in each case by
legal and political traditions), with Frances H. Foster, Parental Law, Harmful Speech, and the
Development of Legal Culture: RussianJudicial Chamber Discourse and Narrative, 54 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. (forthcoming Spring 1997) (describing the problem of translating law between
cultures).
142 See LoPucki, supra note 4, at 1516-21.
143 See, e.g., Benson, supra note 7 (offering a comparative study of Chinese practices
based on interviews with Hong Kong lawyers).
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what the system purports to be doing, rather than what it actually
does.'4
Professor George Triantis and I recently conducted a systems
comparison of United States and Canadian reorganization of finan-
cially distressed companies. 145 We identified the systems to be ana-
lyzed as "the systems for court-supervised reorganization of financially
distressed companies" in the two countries'4 and the goals of the sys-
tem as "reorganiz[ing] viable businesses while minimizing the losses
to all parties during the effort."' 47 In each country, we found three
categories of subsystems: (1) those that triggered or prevented the
triggering of formal reorganization; 14 (2) those that preserved firm
value during the reorganization process; 149 and (3) those that deter-
mined the terms of reorganization.150 We wrote a lengthy article com-
paring how the various functions necessary to the reorganization
process were performed in the two systems. 151
What we found in comparing the two systems was "a remarkable
similarity in function ... masked by sharp doctrinal differences.' 52
For example, a "trustee" was appointed in every Canadian case, while
a "trustee" was rarely appointed in United States cases. The compari-
son was, however, false, because the function of a trustee in the Cana-
dian system was very different from the function of a trustee in the
United States system. 155 Similarly, the Canadian Parliament consid-
ered whether to adopt the United States practice of allowing the judge
to impose a plan on objecting classes of creditors or shareholders.
Parliament expressly rejected the United States rule, leaving objecting
classes of creditors with an ostensible veto power over the plan.' 5 4 We
found, however, that the apparent difference was not real. Liberal
Canadian classification rules gave courts that wished to impose a plan
the ability to gerrymander classes so that they would accept the plan.
The result is that judges in fact have the power to impose plans in
144 See LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 7, at 273-74 (describing one approach to the use
of materials).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 268, 274.
147 Id. at 275.
148 Id. at 279-87.
149 Id. at 288-311.
150 Id. at 316-38. For a similar analysis of reorganization functions, see MARK S.
SCARBERRY ET AL., BUSINEsS RFORGANIZATION IN BANKRupTCy 21 (1996) (identifing the "in-
gredients" needed for reorganization to be successful as follows: (1) "Keeping the Ship
Afloat"; (2) "Turning the Business Around"; (3) "Determining Claims By and Against the
Estate"; and (4) "Restructuring the Debts and Dividing the Enterprise's Value").
151 LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 7, at 340.
152 Id.
153 See id. at 307-09.
154 See id. at 325.
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nearly all circumstances. 15 5 The key to discovering the underlying
similarity between the two systems was to examine what the systems did
instead of what the system purported to do.'
56
D. Evaluating the Work of the Supreme Court
In the traditional view, the United States Supreme Court stands at
the pinnacle of the United States legal system. As cases make their
way through the legal system-that is, the court system-the most im-
portant issues become the subjects of appeals. They can reach the
Supreme Court only if the Court agrees that they are of a certain level
of importance. This system of appeals is generally considered to have
as one of its goals uniform interpretation of the Constitution, statutes,
and other legal doctrine. 57
From the perspective of participants in the many law-related sys-
tems that can fall subject to Supreme Court review, the view is quite
different. Supreme Court intervention in any particular system is
quite rare. When it occurs, the Supreme Court brings to the task a
virtually complete lack of expertise in the system and applies methods
unlikely to enlighten it. From a systems perspective, the Court is a
wild card, striking unexpectedly and focusing not on the system but
on some highly specific facet of it. The Supreme Court's methods-
principally interpretating statutes and applying precedent-place the
focus on petty distinctions in wording, history, and fictional inten-
tions. The materials the Court considers are narrowly legal. Nothing
in the process is designed to familiarize the Court with the workings of
the law-related system in which it is about to intervene.
Consider, for example, the Court's decision in Dewsnup v.
Timm.' 5 8 In that case, the Court addressed whether a Chapter 7
debtor could "'strip down' a creditor's lien on real property to the
value of the collateral, as judicially determined, when that value is less
than the amount of the claim secured by the lien."' 59 Despite the
existence of a statute stating that a Chapter 7 debtor could do so,'6 0
155 See id. at 324-28, 341-42.
156 See Benson, supra note 7, at 185 (applying the method set forth here to a compari-
son of Chinese and U.S. security practices).
157 See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 256 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (referring to the "essential function of the federal courts-to provide a fair and
impartial forum for the uniform interpretation and enforcement of the supreme law of the
land"); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 483 (1981) (referring to "the
desirability of uniform interpretation").
158 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
159 Id. at 412.
160 Title 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994) provides that
[a] n allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the
estate has an interest. . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of
such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property... and is an
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the Court held that a Chapter 7 debtor could not.161 To reach this
result, the Court first strained to find ambiguity in the statute and
then adopted a strained interpretation of the statute. The Court gave
two reasons for the result, one based on legislative history and the
other on the manner in which the court supposed that the system
operated. The law prior to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code had permitted
a secured creditor's lien to "pass[ ] through bankruptcy unaf-
fected."'162 Indeed, that language appeared in some of the legislative
history of the 1978 Code.163 The Court presumed it should continue
to do so. The systemic reason the Court gave for not permitting the
"strip down" was that it would cause the creditor to "lose the benefit of
any increase in the value of the property by the time of the foreclosure
sale."164
This second reason-the only part of the opinion that addresses
the functioning of the bankruptcy system-evidences a curious misun-
derstanding on the part of the Court. The Court supposed that the
bankruptcy judge would determine the value of the property, and
then there would be a substantial delay during which the value of the
property might appreciate and finally a foreclosure in which the
debtor would be able to claim the appreciation. In fact, bankruptcy
practice permits a variety of creditor strategies for avoiding the occur-
rence of a time gap, the loss of appreciation, and even the foreclosure
itself.' 65
The Court was probably unaware that, in or out of bankruptcy, a
debtor can reduce the value of a secured debt to the value of the
collateral by a variety of means. Assume, for example, that the debtor
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest... is
less than the amount of such allowed claim.
Tide 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1994) provides that "[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim
against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void." For cases and
comment agreeing with the interpretation I present here, see infra notes 167-68 and ac-
companying text.
161 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417.
162 Id. at 418.
163 See id. at 419.
164 Id. at 417.
165 For example, (1) the Chapter 7 trustee may distribute collateral directly to the
secured creditor, see 11 U.S.C. § 725 (1994); see also LoPuciu, supra note 111, at 398-99
(discussing § 725); (2) the Chapter 7 trustee may, with the consent of the secured creditor,
sell the property during the chapter 7 case, thus fixing the value as the net sale price, see 11
U.S.C. § 363(f) (1994); In re Kids Stop of America, Inc., 64 B.R. 397, 402 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1986); LoPucri, supra note 111, at 400-07; Barry E. Adler, Creditor Rights AfterJohnson and
Dewsnup, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 1 (1993-94) (arguing that the correct resolution of the Dew-
snup problem is to force liquidation of the collateral in the bankruptcy court rather than to
permit the lien to "pass through bankruptcy unaffected"); (3) the court may lift the stay,
permit the secured creditor to take possession of the collateral and sell it, and then fix the
value on the basis of the sale price, see 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988); or (4) the bankruptcy
court may conduct the foreclosure, see In re Memorial Estates, Inc., 797 F.2d 516 (7th Cir.
1986) (fixing the value as the net sale price).
19971
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owes $10,000 on a car worth $6,000. In theory at least, the debtor can
surrender the car to the secured creditor. The secured creditor will
have to sell it. Based on the assumption of a $6,000 value, the sale
price will not exceed that amount. If the debtor is the purchaser, the
lien in effect has been stripped down.166 Alternatively, the debtor
could strip the lien down through confirmation of a plan under Chap-
ter 11,167 Chapter 12,168 or Chapter 13169 of the Bankruptcy Code. In
providing for an automatic strip-down, Bankruptcy Code §506(d)
opened no new substantive remedy to debtors; it merely permitted
debtors to do directly what debtors already could do by strategic ac-
tion-reduce secured debt to an amount no greater than the value of
the collateral. 170 Section 506(d) enabled the debtor-who is often
the highest and best user of the collateral-to continue to own it and
use it if the debtor chose to do so.
Principally, what Dewsnup accomplished was to channel strategi-
cally-minded debtors into alternative strategies that reached the same
result, though probably with higher transaction costs. 17 1 To the ex-
tent that Dewsnup was "successful" in permitting liens to "pass through
166 In practice, the debtor might encounter some difficulty in becoming the pur-
chaser. If the secured creditor knows that the debtor values the car at an amount above
market price, then the secured creditor might charge an above market price. After the
debtor buys the car, the creditor might enforce the deficiency judgment against the
debtor. Debtor-creditor strategists regard both of these problems as easy to solve.
167 See, e.g., Wade v. Bradford, 39 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e agree with
the majority of courts considering this issue that "Dewsnup's holding cannot be imported
into Chapter 11 cases without eviscerating other key provisions and principles of that reor-
ganization chapter.'") (quoting Dever v. IRS (In reDever), 164 B.R. 132, 133 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1994)); In re Butler, 139 B.R. 258, 259 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1992) (holding that the
application of Dewsnup to a reorganization case would "gut the sum and substance of the
reorganization and rehabilitation of debt concept[s]").
168 See, e.g., Harmon v. United States, 184 B.R. 352, 354 (D.S.D. 1995) ("'Chapter 12
was specifically designed to facilitate the stripping down of liens on family farms with repay-
ment of reduced debt by installments under a plan of reorganization-in other words,
exactly what the Dewsnup debtors were trying to do.'") (quoting In re Dever, 164 B.R. at
139).
169 See, e.g., Bank One, Chicago, NA v. Flowers (In re Bank One), 183 B.R. 509, 513-14
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that the phrase "allowed secured claim" in § 506(d) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code should not be given the same meaning in Chapter 13 that Dewsnup assigned to
it in Chapter 7 and permitting lien stripping in Chapter 13 after Dewsnup).
170 See Adler, supra note 165, at 16 (arguing that the correct resolution of the Dewsnup
problem is to force liquidation of the collateral in the bankruptcy court rather than to
permit the lien to "pass through bankruptcy unaffected"); Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of
the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's Bankmptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q.
535, 584-85 (1993) (arguing against the result in Dewsnup, because it enables the secured
creditor to recover more than the market value of the collateral whereas "strip down simply
replicates [the legitimate elements of] state law foreclosure proceedings-the creditor is
left with the value of the collateral").
171 See, e.g., Hoffman Farms v. Pokela (In re Hoffman Farms), 195 B.R 80, 83 (Bankr.
D.S.D. 1996) (noting a line of cases in which strategy-minded debtors have, with mixed
success, employed the "strip down" available in the reorganization chapters, and then con-
verted to Chapter 7 to discharge the unsecured portion of the lien); In re Dever, 164 B.R. at
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bankruptcy unaffected," it gave the creditor control of the collateral
and thwarted a central goal of the bankruptcy system: to prevent hold-
ups. 172 The reaction of the bankruptcy community to Dewsnup bor-
dered on contempt.173
Given that the Court has little or no expertise regarding the sys-
tems with which it tinkers and no systematic means of acquiring the
benefit of the expertise of others, 174 mistakes like Dewsnup probably
133 (permitting debtors to strip liens by converting their Chapter 7 case into a liquidating
Chapter 11 case).
- 172 Generally speaking, a "hold-up" is a bargaining position based on the ability to
harm the other party, without benefit to one's self. The secured creditor who "controls the
collateral" has the ability to deprive the debtor of the collateral, but cannot get more than
market value by selling it to someone else. See Margaret Howard, Stripping Down Liens:
Section 506(d) and the Theory of Bankruptcy, 65 Am: BANKR. LJ. 373, 419-20 (1991) ("Denial of
strip down carries a potential for inappropriate strategic behavior by creditors that runs
counter to Congress' [sic] demonstrated concern with creditor misbehavior. This concern
appears throughout the Code."); Rasmussen, supra note 170, at 585 (explaining that "[a]t
an actual foreclosure sale, the creditor can bid in its claim even though this claim exceeds
the value of the collateral... [thereby] forc[ing] the bidding... up to the subjective value
which the debtor attaches to the [collateral]").
173 See, e.g., Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone m
Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1285 (5th Cir. 1992) (Jones, J., dissenting from grant of
rehearing) ("How one should approach issues of a statutory construction arising from the
Bankruptcy Code has been clouded, in my view, by Dewsnup v. Timm"); In re Dever, 164
B.R. at 138 (arguing that "[t]he basic premises of the Dewsnup opinion are faulty" and
stating that "that the Dewsnup rule is unworkable in Chapter 11 strongly suggests that the
Supreme Court should reconsider its decision"); Taffi v. United States (In re Taffi), 144
B.R. 105, 114 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992) (referring to the "faulty statutory analysis engaged in
by the Dewsnup majority" and hypothesizing "[i]f I could apply 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) as Con-
gress wrote it."); Margaret Howard, Dewsnupping the Bankruptcy Code, 1 J. BA~NR. L. & PRAc.
513 (1992) (discussing the unfortunate consequences of Dewsnup); Lawrence Ponoroff,
Construction Claims in Bankruptcy: Making the Best of a Bad Situation, 11 BA9'4KR. DE. J. 343,
356 n.60 (1995) (stating that "[t]he emerging view... seems to wisely limit the holding in
Dewsnup to the facts of the case"); Jane Kaufman Winn, Lien Stripping After Nobelman, 27
Loy. LA. L. REv. 541, 553 (1994) (referring to Dewsnup as "widely criticized" and a
"strained interpretation"); see also Karen Gross, Justice Thurgood Marshall's Bankruptcy Juris-
prudence: A Tribute; 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 447, 456-57, 457 n.81 (1993) (stating that she pre-
dicted the opposite outcome in Dewsnup from a reading of the text and referring to the
Court's approach as "mock-textualism"); Rasmussen, supra note 170, at 585 (stating of Dew-
snup that "[a] practical reasoning approach relying on traditional bankruptcy policy would
reach a contrary result"). But see Adler, supra note 165, at 2 (acknowledging that the Dew-
snup Court "refused to honor the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code," but applauding
the decision because it protected creditors against erroneous valuations by bankruptcy
judges).
174 The Court might get the benefit of the expertise of the bankruptcy judge who
decides the case in the first instance, but only haphazardly. The bankruptcyjudge may not
write an opinion or may not give it the consideration it would receive if the judge knew
that the case was bound for the Supreme Court. In many instances, the bankruptcyjudge
will not have the level of expertise that a system designer would call upon. Most impor-
tantly, the system provides no practical means for the bankruptcy judge to interact with the
Court by, for example, answering the Justices' questions on matters that puzzled them.
Amicus briefs are another possible source of information. But briefs are a poor me-
dium for presenting a systems analysis, even if the brief writer were aware of the possibility
and had the expertise to conduct such an analysis.
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occur with great regularity. In deciding cases, the Court should con-
cern itself with the objectives of both the court system and the law-
related system in which the Court intervenes. The discussion ofJudge
Kozinski's decision in Peregrine in Part IV illustrates the distinction be-
tween these two sets of objectives. When Judge Kozinski talked about
"4parallel state recordation systems that could put parties on construc-
tive notice as to encumbrances on copyrights . .. interfer[ing] with
the effectiveness of the federal recordation scheme," 175 he demon-
strated his concern with the objectives of the recordation system.
When Judge Kozinski acknowledged that "this is the system Congress
has established and the court is not in a position to order more ade-
quate procedures," he demonstrated his concern with the objectives
of the system that allocates authority to legislatures and courts. 176 In
short, Judge Kozinski recognized the authority of Congress to pre-
scribe questionable procedures for the recordation system, because
only such a recognition could assure the continued smooth function-
ing of the court system.17 7 If one assumes thatJudge Kozinski was in a
better position than the legislature to decide what is best for the recor-
dation system, then the trade-off was unfortunate. One might wonder
whether it is possible to design a system that allowed the pursuit of
both sets of objectives in optimal combination. 78 That is the kind of
question that systems analysis is uniquely suited to explore.
175 National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re Peregrine En-
tertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 201 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990).
176 Id. at 203 n.10. The objectives of this system are captured in Professor Robert Sum-
mers's concept of "systemic formality." Robert S. Summers, The Fonnal Character of Law III,
25 REcHTSTHEORIE 125, 143 (1994).
177 The lack of concern with the functioning of the court system was Justice Scalia's
principal objection to the majority's opinion in Dewsnup. Scalia wrote:
The principal harm caused by today's decision is not the misinterpretation
of § 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. The disposition that misinterpreta-
tion produces brings the Code closer to prior practice and is, as the Court
irrelevantly observes, probably fairer from the standpoint of natural jus-
tice.... The greater and more enduring damage of today's opinion con-
sists in its destruction of predictability, in the Bankruptcy Code and
elsewhere .... When a seemingly clear provision can be pronounced "am-
biguous" sans textual and structural analysis, ... innumerable statutory
texts become worth litigating.
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 435 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178 The judge who has concrete facts is in a better position to make certain kinds of
decisions. That may at least partially explain why the American legal system has evolved
from one in which judges did not "make" law to one in which they do. See POSNER, supra
note 125, at 5 (arguing that judges appropriately make law in a restricted class of cases
because of their access to "the information generated by the parties to concrete disputes");
Cf. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 35-45 (1970) (discussing the reasons for
maintaining the myth thatjudges do not make law). But see Henderson, Process Constraints,
supra note 7, at 907-11 (describing the planning problems resulting from the mutual inter-
dependency of issues as "polycentric," and arguing that they are unsuitable for the adjudi-




A complex, modem society is composed of law-related systems
that perform a variety of functions. Among other things, these sys-
tems process litigation, produce goods and services, provide financing
for entrepreneurs, gather and publish information, and control be-
havior in public places. The control necessary for the proper func-
tioning of these systems is provided through physical systems, social
norms, and formal law.
Most legal scholarship is normative; scholars propose changes in
the rules governing these systems. Yet, most legal scholars know little
about the operation of these systems. As a result, no one should take
this type of legal scholarship seriously, and few do. Such scholarship
is out of touch with reality.
In fact, no one may have a very good understanding of the opera-
tion of many of these systems. Members of Congress are unlikely to
understand much about bankruptcy, corporate finance, telecommuni-
cations, or most of the other systems they attempt to alter through
legislation. Staff members who write the legislative history rarely have
much expertise. Both look to lobbyists and those they represent for
information and understanding. Those who are participants in the
law-related system will ordinarily understand how the system affects
them, but most are not well situated to observe the system's overall
functioning. 79 For the most part, the systems are not designed; they
simply grow up over time. Courts, legislatures, and administrative
agencies occasionally attempt to make changes in them, but nearly
always incrementally and often without success.' 80
The systems approach provides a way for legal scholars to get in
touch with reality, to discover how law-related systems work through
empiricism, and to discover how they can be improved through mod-
eling. The method is analogous to the kind of systems analysis used to
manage complexity in the creation of business information systems
and other complex computer programs. A basic text on building
business information systems defines systems analysis as "the investiga-
tion of a system to decide what needs to be done to make it more
179 My impression gleaned from twenty-five years of studying the bankruptcy system,
during which time I have formally interviewed hundreds of lawyers and discussed bank-
ruptcy with many more, is that bankruptcy lawyers know a great deal about the kinds of
cases they handle, but are surprisingly ignorant about what is going on in the rest of the
bankruptcy system. Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter 11: An Agendafor Basic Reform, 69 AM. BANKR.
LJ. 573, 580 (1995) (arguing that "the Chapter 11 procedure designed by big-case lawyers
for big cases has produced unreasonable delay and expense in ordinary Chapter 11
cases").
180 See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 79,
81 (1959) (describing "successive limited comparisons" as the process by which public
agencies actually solve complex problems).
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efficient and effective."18' That often is precisely the task of legal
scholars with respect to law-related systems.
The first step in building a business information system is to fig-
ure out what the company wants the system to do-that is, the purposes
of the system. To do that, the analyst examines the existing system to
see how it works and interviews people in the company to find out
how the system presently serves them and how it could serve them
better in the future. The second step is to generate a system design, a
sort of "blueprint" for the system. This blueprint "identif[ies] the
components of a system and specif[ies] their operation and
interaction." 182
For the law-related systems with which I am most familiar, bank-
ruptcy and secured credit, there is no equivalent to this blueprint-no
document or model that purports to state what purposes the systems
are supposed to serve or how they are supposed to operate. Legisla-
tive history generally is simplistic. The fact that these systems operate
without blueprints may explain why many of them work so badly.
Legal scholars are the persons in our society best situated to analyze
these systems and document them.
To analyze a law-related system, the analyst must take account of
the complex interrelationships among its parts. The limit on what the
analyst can accomplish in that regard is the limit on what the human
mind-with whatever external aids are available-can comprehend.
Systems analysis is a methodology specifically directed at the manage-
ment of complexity. The analytical power of the methodology is a
function of the number of goals, elements, and circumstances that the
methodology can take into account simultaneously. Systems analysis
is powerful specifically because it seeks to maximize that number.
The type of systems analysis described in this Article is heavily
dependent on empiricism. Systems analysis identifies the questions
for empirical research and thereby provides the theoretical framework
for empirical inquiry. One can conduct a systems analysis norma-
tively, but that analysis does not have inherent normative content. By
making the putative goals and system functions explicit, systems analy-
sis facilitates normative debate. In the process, it offers humanity the
opportunity to take conscious control of the systems by which we live.
181 GIBSON & HUGHES, supra note 5, at 7-8.
182 Id. at 9.
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